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INTRODUCTION
[The government] was armed with more power than any of the
kings . . . had ever possessed. For it had become, in fact, an
absolute sovereign, and in addition the heir of a revolution which
had broken down all the barriers that laws, customs, and mores had
previously opposed to the abuse and sometimes to the use of
power.
Alexis de Tocqueville1

Liberal democracy is like a game in which many of the rules are
unwritten. The importance of these unwritten rules becomes obvious
as soon as they are discarded or disregarded. Whether the rules are
discarded or disregarded, at some point it becomes unclear whether the
same game is still even being played.
Since games are typically defined by their rules, the idea of
“unwritten rules” introduces an element of uncertainty. But this is not
the kind of uncertainty that makes the right decision harder to
determine,2 or the wrong decision easier to conceal, confuse, or
explain away.3 Nor is it the kind of uncertainty that general principles
and broad norms bring to the relatively straightforward rules they
underwrite and justify.4 H.L.A. Hart wrote of the “open texture” of

1

2

3

2 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, THE OLD REGIME AND THE REVOLUTION 191
(François Furet & Françoise Mélonio eds., Alan S. Kahan trans., 2001).
See, e.g., James Comey, Opinion, A Critique That Strengthens the F.B.I., N.Y.
TIMES, June 15, 2018, at A25 (“I was not certain I was right about those things
at the time. That’s the nature of hard decisions; they don’t allow for certainty.”).
See, e.g., Julie Hirschfeld Davis & Maggie Haberman, Trump Embraces
Shadowy Plots, Eroding Trust, N.Y. TIMES, May 29, 2018, at A1.
Mr. Trump’s willingness to peddle suspicion as fact . . . is a vital
ingredient in the president’s communications arsenal, a social
media-fueled, brashly expressed narrative of dubious accusations
and dark insinuations that allows him to promote his own version
of reality . . . . “He’s the blame shifter in chief,” said Gwenda
Blair, a Trump biographer . . . . “It goes to this idea that you can’t
believe anything that you read or see. He has sold us a whole way
of accepting a narrative that has so many layers of unaccountable,
unsubstantiated content that you can’t possibly peel it all back.”

4

Id.
See RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 22–28 (1978). “[R]ules . . .
set out legal consequences that follow automatically when the conditions
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law.5 There is much to be filled in (or out, as the case may be), many
implications that need implementing, and many concrete details to be
distilled from the spare language of a rule.
In a well-functioning liberal democracy, this “play in the joints” is
normally lubricated by established institutional practices that draw on
institutional memory, situational judgments that fall well within the
realm of rationality, a shared sense of moral purpose, and not least by
common sense and good faith. These all inform the “unwritten rules”
of liberal democracy. Otherwise, where the written rules end,
authoritarian tyranny may well begin.
This Article is set amidst the distinctly unsettled and unsettling
state of governmental practices, legislative policy, and presidential
politics of contemporary America. Immediacy, too, introduces its own
uncertainty—as compared to the comfortable vantage point of the
distant future. But, as I shall argue, there is no realistic alternative to
beginning in medias res. To address these issues as they inherently
demand, the usual precedents and protocols and precautions must be
set aside—if they are not already “gone with the wind.”6
Since the 2016 Presidential Election, and even before, threats to
liberal democracy have emerged, in plausible form, as never before in

5

provided are met . . . . A principle . . . states a reason that argues in one
direction, but does not necessitate a particular decision.” Id. at 25–26.
See H. L. A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 124–36 (2d ed. 1994).
Even when verbally formulated general rules are used,
uncertainties as to the form of behaviour required by them may
break out in particular concrete cases . . . .
....
The open texture of law means that there are, indeed, areas of
conduct where much must be left to be developed by courts or
officials striking a balance . . . between competing interests . . . .

6

Id. at 126, 135.
Come writers and critics
Who prophesize with your pen
And keep your eyes wide
The chance won’t come again
And don’t speak too soon
For the wheel’s still in spin . . .
For the times they are a-changin’
BOB DYLAN, The Times They Are A-Changin’, on THE TIMES THEY ARE ACHANGIN’ (Warner Bros. Inc. 1964).
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American history. This is largely a tale about the parlous state of
“unwritten rules” in a thoroughly politicized polity. Part I traces out
two of the most important stages in this development.
Liberal democracy depends not only on governmental institutions
and officials but, indirectly, on the personal qualities those officials
bring to their duties and responsibilities. Nowhere is this more
important than at the top of the Executive Branch of government,
where personality disorders of the President may take on constitutional
significance. “Crazytown”—as it has been called—is thus the subject
of Part II.7
Finally, Part III considers the roles of both “Input Controls” and
“Output Controls” in protecting liberal democracy against the threat of
authoritarian tyranny. For purposes of discussion, a proposed
constitutional amendment is introduced and defended. This is an
important intellectual exercise, for “without the constant effort to
repair and construct liberal institutions of government . . . it is only a
matter of time before one or another zealot will seize the chance to
impose his private nightmare on the rest of us.”8
I. A LEGACY OF ILLEGITIMACY
A. Advice and Consent in the Shadow of the Law
On February 12, 2016, Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia took
a trip to a remote resort ranch in Texas. The location—in the extreme
Southwest corner of Texas, barely forty miles from the Mexican
border—was hundreds of miles from any major highways, so the
preferred way of getting there was by private plane from Houston to an
airstrip on the vast, mountainous ranch.9 On the day of his arrival,
Justice Scalia observed some of the activities and was driven to some
hunting sites. In the evening, he had dinner with friends and
acquaintances at the main lodge, but he retired somewhat early, citing

7

8
9

See Philip Rucker & Robert Costa, Bob Woodward’s New Book Reveals a
‘Nervous Breakdown’ of Trump’s Presidency, WASH. POST (Sept. 4, 2018, 11:08
AM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/bob-woodwards-new-bookreveals-a-nervous-breakdown-of-trumps-presidency/2018/09/04/b27a389e-ac6011e8-a8d7-0f63ab8b1370_story.html [https://perma.cc/VP5W-9P44] (“We’re in
Crazytown.” (quoting White House Chief of Staff John F. Kelly)).
BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE 313 (1980).
See Alan Blinder & Manny Fernandez, Texas Ranch is Rugged Oasis for the
Famous, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 14, 2016, at A23.
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tiredness. Sometime during the night of February 12-13, Justice Scalia
fell into a deep sleep—a sleep from which he was never to awaken.10
The next morning, when Justice Scalia did not come to breakfast or
subsequent events, the ranch owner, John Poindexter, went to check on
him. Justice Scalia was lying serenely in bed, seemingly undisturbed—
but not alive. “[I]t took no medical training . . . to recognize that
Justice Scalia was dead.”11
Chaos quickly ensued. There were no doctors or officials anywhere
on the premises who could render any relevant assistance equal to the
task at hand.12 Thus, a sitting Supreme Court Justice was officially
pronounced dead—over the telephone—by a county judge many miles
away, on the assurances of those random laymen present at the scene
that the Justice was, indeed, dead.13
The news quickly began to spread eastward toward Washington,
D.C. There, chaos ensued all over again, though on a much grander
scale. The political, legal, and institutional significance of Scalia’s
death could hardly be overstated. He was the intellectual leader of the
Court’s conservative wing, the epicenter of its considerable moral
force, an ideological inspiration to like-minded conservatives such as
Clarence Thomas, and a genial, gregarious friend to liberals like Elena
Kagan and Ruth Bader Ginsburg.14 He was the proverbial
“heavyweight,” with a personality larger than life. Jeffrey Toobin
wrote of him at the time of the Citizens United case:
More than anyone, Scalia was responsible for transforming the
dynamics of oral arguments at the Supreme Court. When Scalia
became a Justice, in 1986, the Court sessions were often somnolent
affairs, but his rapid-fire questioning spurred his colleagues to try
to keep pace, and, as Roberts said, in a tribute to Scalia on his
twenty-fifth anniversary as a Justice, “the place hasn’t been the

10

11
12

13
14

See Alan Blinder & Manny Fernandez, Owner of Texas Ranch Recalls Finding
Justice’s Body, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 15, 2016, at A14.
Id.
See Eva Ruth Moravec et al., The Death of Antonin Scalia: Chaos, Confusion,
and Conflicting Reports, WASH. POST (Feb. 14, 2016), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/politics/texas-tv-station-scalia-died-of-a-heartattack/2016/02/14/938e2170-d332-11e5-9823-02b905009f99_story.html
[https://perma.cc/2TRM-BNJX].
See id.
See Adam Liptak, Justice Scalia, Who Led Court’s Conservative Renaissance,
Dies at 79, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 14, 2016, at A1.
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same since.” Alternately witty and fierce, Scalia invariably made
clear where he stood.15

The ground began to shift—and not in a good way—beneath
conservative centers of power like Washington think tanks and the
offices of Republican Senators and Congressmen all across Capitol
Hill. The portentous implications ran far beyond even the wildest
dreams that liberal schemers could have concocted on their own. At
the time, the Court was finely balanced between four solid, reliable
conservatives and four solid, reliable liberals; the balancing point (and
the fifth vote) was the fickle and unreliable Anthony Kennedy.
Subtracting Justice Scalia’s vote from the conservative column and
adding it to the liberal column portended a five-Justice liberal majority
that could prevail indefinitely—with or without the help of Justice
Kennedy. Replacing Justice Scalia with an Obama appointee would
rival in magnitude the Court’s greatest ideological shift ever, when
ultra-liberal Justice Thurgood Marshall was replaced by archconservative Justice Clarence Thomas—a parting gift of President
George H.W. Bush.
Hence, the chaos in Washington following Justice Scalia’s death.
A conservative political calamity was on the cusp of unfolding; a
massive legal realignment was palpably in sight. But amidst all the
sound and the fury, there quietly emerged one man who—by his swift,
decisive, and prescient actions—gave the impression of having
prepared far in advance (indeed, his whole life) for just this moment.
That man was Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell.
Within hours of the news that Justice Scalia had died, Senator
McConnell issued a Press Release in which he and his wife purportedly sent “our deepest condolences to the entire Scalia family.”
Today our country lost an unwavering champion of a timeless
document that unites each of us as Americans. Justice Scalia’s
fidelity to the Constitution was rivaled only by the love of his
family: his wife Maureen, his nine children, and his many
grandchildren. Through the sheer force of his intellect and his
legendary wit, this giant of American jurisprudence almost
singlehandedly revived an approach to constitutional interpretation
that prioritized the text and original meaning of the Constitution.

15

Jeffrey Toobin, Money Unlimited: How Chief Justice John Roberts Orchestrated
the Citizens United Decision, NEW YORKER, May 21, 2012, at 36.
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Elaine and I send our deepest condolences to the entire Scalia
family.16

But this was no ordinary letter of “condolences”; it ended with an
ominous, dagger-like twist: “The American people should have a voice
in the selection of their next Supreme Court Justice. Therefore, this
vacancy should not be filled until we have a new President.”17 (Just in
case anyone missed the point, those last two sentences were set in
bold-face type.) Thus, what purported to be a note of sympathy
actually appears, on closer inspection, to be the vehicle for announcing
a brazen political gambit: the Senate would not even consider a
Supreme Court nominee during President Obama’s final year in
office—regardless of who that nominee might be.
The stated purpose of this unprecedented refusal was to give the
American people “a voice in the selection of their next Supreme Court
Justice.”18 But of course, the American people already had a “voice”
in the selection of Justice Scalia’s successor: they elected President
Barack Obama (twice) who, according to the Constitution, “shall
nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall
appoint . . . Judges of the supreme Court.”19
The Constitution makes no attempt to distribute opportunities for
making Supreme Court appointments “evenly” among Presidents, nor
does it do anything to guard against an “uneven” distribution.
(President Jimmy Carter, for example, never had the opportunity to
appoint a single Justice during his four-year term of office.)20 Instead,
the matter is left entirely to chance and the vagaries and vicissitudes of
death and resignation. One might say that it is “random” and in this
sense similar to decision by a fair (i.e., random) lottery.
On this point there is substantial agreement with a maritime
condition of extremity “for which all writers have prescribed the same
rule:”21
16

17
18
19
20

21

Press Release, Mitch McConnell, Senate Majority Leader, Justice Antonin
Scalia (Feb. 13, 2016), https://www.republicanleader.senate.gov/newsroom/
press-releases/justice-antonin-scalia [https://perma.cc/9KY9-QSAT] (Statement
on the Passing of Justice Antonin Scalia).
Id. (emphasis added).
Id. (emphasis added).
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (emphasis added).
Judgeship Appointments by President, U.S. COURTS, https://www.uscourts.gov/
sites/default/files/apptsbypres.pdf [https://perma.cc/6RG7-QXYZ].
United States v. Holmes, 26 F. Cas. 360, 367 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1842) (No. 15,383).
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When the ship is in no danger of sinking, but all sustenance is
exhausted, and a sacrifice of one person is necessary to appease the
hunger of others, the selection is by lot. This mode is resorted to as
the fairest mode, and, in some sort, as an appeal to God, for
selection of the victim.22

Likewise, it is as if the opportunities for Supreme Court appointments
are determined by God. (At least, that is one way of reading what the
Constitution contemplates.) God determines whether the Scalia seat
will become vacant during the Obama Presidency or during the Trump
Presidency.
This possibility Senator McConnell could not abide—this matter
was far too important to be left to God. Thus, the good Senator thought
to himself: “It is as if I were God. For I, too, can shift the Scalia
vacancy from the Obama Presidency into the Trump Presidency.”
“And so it was. God saw all he had made, and indeed it was very
good.”23
Senator McConnell was aided in this grandest of larcenies by the
fact that most of the “rules” governing Supreme Court appointments
are unwritten. Again, the spare but imperative constitutional language
states only that “[t]he President . . . shall nominate, and by and with
the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint . . . Judges of the
supreme Court.”24 All the rest is unwritten: the courtesy visits, the
Judiciary Committee hearings, statements and testimony by the
nominee, expert testimony before the Committee, a Committee vote,
referral to the full Senate, debate on the Senate floor, and finally a
Senate vote.
Again, Senator McConnell undoubtedly thought to himself:
This case is far too consequential to risk all that. Chief Judge
Merrick Garland [President Obama’s nominee] may very well
prove to be an exceptionally qualified jurist of the highest caliber.
There is too much—politically—at stake here to risk that. There
must be no Committee hearings, no Committee vote, no Senate
vote—nothing. Not even so much as a handshake for that poor
hostage Garland.

And so it was.
As discussed below, I believe that President Obama, and perhaps
Judge Garland himself, could plausibly have invoked the legal system
to argue the contrary. There is a federal common law of Supreme
22
23
24

Id. (emphasis added).
Genesis 1:31 (Jerusalem Bible) (emphasis added).
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (emphasis added).
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Court appointments, and no comparable nominee has ever been
categorically denied the opportunity even to be considered.25
The historical rule that best accounts for the entire history of
Supreme Court appointments is . . . the following: Although the
Senate has the constitutional power to provide advice and consent
on particular Supreme Court nominees (and hence to reject or
resist individual nominees on the merits), the Senate may only
deliberately transfer one President’s Supreme Court appointment
powers to an unknown successor . . . if there are contemporaneous
questions about the status of the nominating President as the most
recently elected President.26

Nevertheless, the Senate Judiciary Committee endorsed
McConnell’s approach with a statement signed by all the Republican
members of the Committee.27 The stakes could hardly have been
higher, and it was crucially important to shape and frame perceptions
quickly, even before they had time to form. (One hallmark of an
illegitimate sales pitch is to deny the audience any opportunity to
reflect on what it is being sold.)28 That meant: shifting debate away
25

See, e.g., Robin Bradley Kar & Jason Mazzone, The Garland Affair: What
History and the Constitution Really Say About President Obama’s Powers to
Appoint a Replacement for Justice Scalia, 91 N.Y.U. L. REV. ONLINE 53, 73–76
(2016).
[T]here have been 103 prior cases in total in which—as in the case
of Obama’s nomination of Garland—an elected President
nominated someone to fill an actual Supreme Court vacancy prior
to the election of the President’s successor. In all 103 cases, which
go all the way back to the earliest days of the Republic, the sitting
President has been able both to nominate and appoint a
replacement Justice—by and with the advice and consent of the
Senate.
....
[T]here is no case in U.S. history where an elected President
nominated a Supreme Court Justice during an election year (but
prior to the election of his presidential successor) and failed to
appoint a replacement Justice.

26
27

28

Id. at 73, 75 (second emphasis added).
Id. at 60 (emphasis added).
Letter from Senate Judiciary Comm., to Mitch McConnell, Senate Majority
Leader (Feb. 23, 2016), https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/2719115/
Senate-SCOTUS-Letter.pdf [https://perma.cc/F7EF-UDQX].
See, e.g., Charles W. Collier, Intellectual Authority and Institutional Authority,
42 J. LEGAL EDUC. 151, 166 (1992).
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from the merits of any particular nominee and toward the issue of
whether there should be an election-year appointment at all. So,
shortly after Justice Scalia’s untimely death, the Republicans on the
Senate Judiciary Committee issued a McConnell-style broadside—
addressed to McConnell himself:
We intend to exercise the constitutional power granted the
Senate under Article II, Section 2 to ensure the American people
are not deprived of the opportunity to engage in a full and robust
debate over the type of jurist they wish to decide some of the most
critical issues of our time . . . .
Accordingly, given the particular circumstances under which
this vacancy arises, we wish to inform you of our intention to
exercise our constitutional authority to withhold consent on any
nominee to the Supreme Court submitted by this President to fill
Justice Scalia’s vacancy.29

This is a little like saying: “We intend to exercise our constitutional
power and authority by not exercising them.”
At any rate, a letter from eleven Senate Republicans to their
Majority Leader is of no constitutional significance. However, it could
be considered a shot across the bow—an unofficial warning that the
Senate might be planning to abdicate its constitutional duties and
responsibilities that year. After all, the Constitution does not say: “The
President shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of
the Senate, shall appoint . . . Judges of the supreme Court—unless the
Senate elects not to participate in the appointments process that
year.”30 In fact, the Constitution recognizes no way that the Senate

Milgram’s experiments were . . . conducted in an atmosphere of
great pressure, both temporal and psychological. The experiments
were very smoothly run, highly engineered, “slick” productions.
They took place over a thirty-minute time period, in a confined and
narrow context that afforded no time for thought, no opportunity
for exploration or reflection. It may be that Milgram’s results are
strictly limited to these conditions; under these conditions, and
perhaps only under these conditions, subjects rely on institutional
authority to the extent documented by Milgram.
29
30

Id. (footnote omitted).
Letter from Senate Judiciary Comm., supra note 27.
Cf. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (“[The President] shall nominate, and by and
with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint . . . Judges of the
supreme Court . . . .”).

208

UMass Law Review

v. 15 | 197

could lawfully do this. “Not participating” is not a constitutionally
recognized option under either the written or unwritten law.31
The written law of the Constitution poses two major problems for
this approach. As Kar and Mazzone write:
First, the full Senate is not acting to provide advice at all in such
circumstances. Rather, a number of Republicans on the Senate
Judiciary Committee are preventing floor debates on the ultimate
question whether the Senate advises and consents to the Garland
nomination. Second, and more practically, advice that takes the
form of “we will not act on any nominee [of President Barack
Obama]” cannot provide [that] President with any actionable
advice for how to nominate a candidate who might be appointed
through the Constitution’s designated mechanisms.32

Mitch McConnell cannot and does not speak for “the Senate.” Senate
Judiciary Committee Chairman Charles Grassley cannot and does not
speak for “the Senate,” nor does his faithful cohort of Judiciary
Committee Republicans.
More fundamentally, even if the full Senate were involved, there is
no lawful way it could (in the Judiciary Committee Republicans’
words) “withhold consent on any nominee to the Supreme Court
submitted by this President.”33 Such a general option or power or
authority does not exist—anywhere in the Constitution. It exists only
in the wishful thinking of people like Mitch McConnell (and, perhaps,
in a fabled, far-away place called Neverland). The duty to “advise and
consent” arises only in the context of a specific nomination that has
already been made by the President, as specified in Article II, not
Article I.34 The Senate’s duty is, in this sense, “auxiliary” to the
expressly enumerated powers of the President—not the reverse.

31

32
33
34

It has been suggested that “[a] more likely construction is that the Senate’s
refusal to consider constitutes a withholding of consent.” Email from Russell L.
Weaver, Professor of Law, Univ. of Louisville, to Charles W. Collier, Professor
of Law and Philosophy, Univ. of Fla. (Aug. 7, 2018, 5:54 PM) (on file with
author). Aside from the not-inconsiderable fact that “the Senate” was never
involved, this interpretation would be relevant only if the Constitution were a
kind of logical and psychological guidebook as to How People Think. Instead, it
is more like a Handbook of Limited Governance that underwrites no logical or
psychological inferences—however valid they might be in the abstract—not
clearly included in the Handbook itself.
Kar & Mazzone, supra note 25, at 83–84.
Letter from Senate Judiciary Comm., supra note 27 (emphasis added).
See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
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The Constitution unambiguously assigns to the President the
powers of nomination and appointment—the President “shall nominate” and “shall appoint.” With this second “shall,” the Senate is
brought imperatively into the process: “by and with the Advice and
Consent of the Senate.”35 Once President Obama nominated Chief
Judge Merrick Garland, it was up to the Senate to “advise” and
“consent” or not consent.
[T]he President has constitutional powers at both the nomination
and the appointment stages. Regardless of what it means to
provide advice and consent, senatorial refusal to consider any
nominee from a particular President with the express purpose of
transferring his appointment powers to a successor may therefore
implicate a deeper problem of separation of powers.36

Nevertheless, the Senate still did nothing.37
The unwritten law of the Constitution is equally conclusive and
unsparing. A long-standing and unbroken line of practice creates a
(rebuttable) presumption that the practice should be followed.38
There is . . . simply no historical precedent—recent or otherwise—
for the deliberate transfer of presidential authority that Senate
Republicans seek to effect with respect to the Supreme Court
vacancy left by Justice Scalia. To the contrary, . . . a long-standing
and unbroken line of historical practice emerges.39
35
36
37

Id.
Kar & Mazzone, supra note 25, at 91.
If, by simply doing nothing, the Senate could effectively divest the President of
his constitutional powers of appointment, unacceptable separation-of-powers
concerns would be presented. See, e.g., id. at 92.
The outright senatorial refusal to consider any nominee from the
current President in a deliberate attempt to divest him of his
Supreme Court appointment powers (and transfer them to his
successor) may go beyond the provision of “advice and consent,”
as it has traditionally been construed in the context of Supreme
Court appointments, to undermine one of the President’s
constitutionally-designated powers.

38

39

Id. Thus, the reading in the text is preferred.
Eight Justices have been nominated during an election year, and all eight of
them, including Benjamin Cardozo and Louis Brandeis, were successfully
confirmed. An additional five nominations were made in election years after the
election of the nominating President’s successor; yet these nominees were
confirmed as well, for a total of thirteen election-year appointments. See id. at
74–75.
Id. at 72–73. However, Kar and Mazzone note that:
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In relation to executive power, as Justice Frankfurter explained, “a
systematic, unbroken, executive practice, long pursued to the
knowledge of the Congress and never before questioned . . . may be
treated as a gloss on ‘executive Power’ vested in the President by [the
Constitution].”40 The Senate Republicans’ plan thus labors under the
combined burden of two complementary presumptions: (1) the
presumption that a long-standing and unbroken line of practice should
be followed (formal consideration of any nominee submitted in good
order by any President); and (2) the presumption that a radical
departure from a long-standing and unbroken line of practice should
not be followed (the purported withholding of consent to any nominee
submitted by a particular President—for the express purpose of
transferring that President’s constitutional powers of appointment to a

[T]he Senate has only refused to consider a President’s Supreme
Court nominations in the highly unusual circumstance where the
nominating President’s status as the most recently elected
President has been in doubt . . . . [T]he Republican plan is
historically unprecedented and . . . in fact presents a major
departure from more than two centuries of historical tradition.
Id. at 58, 61.
Our principal historical conclusions therefore hold true without
exception. Put simply, the Senate has sometimes used its “advice
and consent” powers to shape some Presidents’ Supreme Court
choices—either by rejecting or resisting some particular nominees
on their merits and with full Senate consideration. Absent
contemporaneous doubts about the status of a nominating President
as the most recently-elected President, however, the Senate has
never before acted as if it had the further power to completely
divest a sitting President of his Supreme Court appointment
powers.
Id. at 82.
[Addressing] these objections . . . reveal[s] just how powerful the
historical tradition is in the context of Supreme Court appointments, . . . expose[s] the grave pragmatic and constitutional risks
of continuing forward with the Senate Republicans’ current
plan, . . . and risks significant harm to the Court. The costs of
mischief are all the greater where, as here, there is also a plausible
argument that the plan violates the Constitution.
40

Id. at 73, 106.
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 610–11 (1952)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring).
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successor). Furthermore, there are surrounding circumstances in this
particular case that tend to support a presumption of consent.
The Senate had every opportunity—under its normal procedures—
to consider Judge Garland’s nomination and vote it down. That would
have been constitutionally (if not politically) unobjectionable and
uncontroversial. Yet, Senator McConnell and his Republican
colleagues pointedly did not do so—indeed, they were afraid to do
this—because Judge Garland was rightfully perceived as one of the
best and brightest candidates ever nominated to the Supreme Court.41
Once the American public saw and heard Judge Garland on
television—there would have been “hell to pay” for voting against
him.
Under these circumstances, the Senate’s silence takes on added
significance. Not all silences are equal, and in this case there may
arguably have been sufficient surrounding circumstances to support a
presumption of consent. Unofficially, it would have been hard to find
any real criticism of Judge Garland himself from any Senator of either
party.42
41

See, e.g., KAROL CORBIN WALKER, AM. BAR ASS’N, STATEMENT CONCERNING
THE NOMINATION OF THE HONORABLE MERRICK B, GARLAND 8–9 (2016).
In undertaking its extensive nationwide investigation of the
professional qualifications of Judge Garland, the Standing
Committee wrote to and invited input relevant to our investigation
from 3,085 persons, including all federal appellate and district
judges, and magistrate judges, as well as many state judges,
lawyers, and community and bar representatives who were likely
to have personal knowledge of his professional qualifications.
Id. at 4.
The unanimous consensus of everyone we interviewed was that
Judge Garland is superbly competent to serve on the United States
Supreme Court. This significant point warrants repeating: all of the
experienced, dedicated, and knowledgeable sitting judges, several
former solicitor generals from both political parties, legal scholars
from top law schools across the country, and lawyers who have
worked with or against the nominee in private practice,
government or within the judiciary describe the nominee as
outstanding in all respects and cite specific evidence in support of
that view.

42

Id. at 8–9.
See id. at 5 (“Most remarkably, in interviews with hundreds of individuals in the
legal profession and community who knew Judge Garland, whether for a few
years or decades, not one person uttered a negative word about him.”).
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Thus it was left to President Obama to read these uncertain tea
leaves as best he could. Rather than assume that the Senate had
unlawfully abandoned its constitutional role in appointments,43 a more
charitable interpretation of the Senatorial silence might be: “This is all
the ‘Advice and Consent’ you are going to get.” In many
circumstances silence may reasonably be understood as assent; e.g.:
Dearly beloved: We have come together in the presence of God to
witness and bless the joining together of this man and this woman
in Holy Matrimony . . . .
....
. . . If any of you can show just cause why they may not
lawfully be married, speak now; or else for ever hold your peace.44

Having dispensed with the unwritten law themselves, the Republican
Senators could hardly complain if President Obama turned to the
written law, which specifies no particular form for the Senate’s
“Advice and Consent.” (Originally, this consultation was quite brief
and informal, without committee hearings.)45 Numerous commentators
have confirmed that the “Advice and Consent” clause lends itself to
various forms of implementation. The former Dean of the Senate,
Robert Byrd, stated in a 2005 speech that: “There is no stipulation in
the Constitution as to how the Senate is to express its advice or give its
consent.”46 Jonathan Adler has likewise observed: “The appointments
clause . . . does not impose an affirmative duty to consider a nominee
in any particular way . . . . [O]ne cannot consider Senate conduct in
isolation. After all . . . the process necessarily involves engagement
between the executive and legislative branch.”47 Finally, as Kar and
Mazzone put it: “A President’s power to appoint a Supreme Court
Justice has both constitutional and extra-constitutional dimensions.
The power clearly arises from the Constitution but it is exercised

43

44

45

46
47

A standard principle of judicial restraint is not to address or decide constitutional
questions that do not have to be addressed or decided.
THE BOOK OF COMMON PRAYER, THE CELEBRATION AND BLESSING OF A
MARRIAGE 423–24 (2006).
Russell L. Weaver, “Advice and Consent” in Historical Perspective, 64 DUKE
L.J. 1717, 1731–32 (2015).
151 CONG. REC. 4351, 4365 (2005) (emphasis added).
Jonathan H. Adler, The Senate Has No Constitutional Obligation to Consider
Nominees, 24 GEO. MASON L. REV. 15, 19, 31 (2016).
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through a process of engagement—‘advice and consent’—with the
Senate.”48
Thus, in the unprecedented absence of any express grant or
withholding of “consent” to his nominee, President Obama would have
been well within his rights to declare the “Advice and Consent”
requirement presumptively satisfied. (The party doing nothing
constitutionally relevant cannot very well complain that its inaction
should be interpreted in a particular way.) For purposes of rebutting
the presumption of consent, the individual Senators could all have
been given a specified period, during which they could go officially on
the record as opposing the appointment (a new, unwritten rule,
according to which the officially expressed opposition—by a majority
of the individual Senators—would constitute the Senate’s withholding
of consent to an appointment). If this procedure did not yield a
withholding of consent, President Obama could then have proceeded
to appoint Justice Garland and sign his commission. Sometimes,
unprecedented problems require unprecedented solutions.49
The fact that this solution might not comport with the Senate’s
own “Rules of Proceedings” is—under the circumstances—not a valid
objection. As noted above, the Senate’s constitutional duty to “advise
and consent or not consent” arises only in the context of a specific
48
49

Kar & Mazzone, supra note 25, at 58.
Under the circumstances, President Obama clearly passed up some opportunities
for creative thinking and some solutions, unlike that in the text, that do not make
use of a “presumption of consent.”
(1) President Obama could have addressed a public letter to Senate
Majority Leader Mitch McConnell informing him of his intention
to poll the Senate on the question of “consent” to the Garland
appointment—unless the normal procedures for considering a
Supreme Court nominee were initiated within a reasonable time.
(2) If this notification produced no relevant results, the President
could then have proceeded to poll all the Senators individually, on
the question of “consent” to the Garland appointment. Nothing in
the written law of the Constitution precludes this (or any other)
means of obtaining the “Advice and Consent” of the Senate.
(3) The Senators’ responses would all be released publicly. If a
majority of the Senators clearly favored the appointment of Judge
Garland, the President could then proceed to appoint Justice
Garland and sign his commission. (Otherwise, the nomination
would be withdrawn, just as if the full Senate had voted against the
nominee.)
(4) Assuming someone wanted to challenge any of the above
approaches in court, who would have standing to do so?
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nomination that has already been made by the President; in this sense,
the Senatorial duty is “auxiliary” to the expressly enumerated powers
of the President. The form of this “Advice and Consent” is not in any
way limited in Article II—nor is it even mentioned in Article I. In
purporting to withhold consent—in advance—to any nominee
submitted by President Obama, Senator McConnell and the
Republican members of the Senate Judiciary Committee violated their
own “Rules of Proceedings,” specifically Senate Rule 31, which states
in part: “When nominations shall be made by the President of the
United States to the Senate . . . the final question on every nomination
shall be, ‘Will the Senate advise and consent to this nomination?’”50
Obviously, “the Senate” was never consulted by this renegade faction
on the question of a purported general withholding of consent—in
advance of any particular nomination. And the “final question” as to
“this nomination”—the Garland nomination—was obviously never
addressed and eo ipso never answered, one way or the other, by
anyone—least of all by “the Senate.” Thus, after refusing to allow the
Senate to carry out its constitutional duty, these “leaders” of the Senate
cannot very well complain when the performance of their duty is
facilitated, in alternative fashion, by the very branch of government
(the Executive) directly and primarily empowered by the Constitution
to nominate and appoint (“by and with the Advice and Consent of the
Senate”). In this case, it seems, the Senate was “otherwise occupied,”
in time-honored fashion, with the Great Game of partisan politics.
Ultimately, the Garland nomination simply languished in the
Senate for 293 days—far longer than any other Supreme Court
nomination in U.S. history—and then expired with the end of the
114th Congress.51 Thus, the Senate’s silence functioned in this case—
as intended—to divest President Obama of his constitutional power of
appointment, raising unacceptable separation-of-powers concerns and
contravening both the written and unwritten law of the Constitution:
[T]he Senate Republicans’ . . . plan is truly unprecedented . . . .
....

50

51

STANDING RULES OF THE SENATE, S. DOC. NO. 113-18, at 43 (2013) (emphasis
added).
See Jon Schuppe, Merrick Garland Now Holds the Record for Longest Supreme
Court Wait, NBC NEWS (July 20, 2016, 2:14 PM), https://
www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/merrick-garland-now-holds-record-longestsupreme-court-wait-n612541 [https://perma.cc/PLX9-JMKA].
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. . . By announcing in advance that they will not consider any
nominee from the current President, Senate Republicans may
have . . . taken the one position that is most clearly contradicted by
the entire history of Supreme Court appointment processes . . . .
[H]istory strongly suggests that an outright refusal to do anything
at all in order to deliberately transfer one President’s appointment
power to an unknown successor . . . raises unprecedented constitutional questions relating to separation of powers . . . .52

“[S]ometimes,” writes Chief Justice Roberts, “‘the most telling
indication of [a] severe constitutional problem . . . is the lack of
historical precedent’ for Congress’s action.”53 In Kar and Mazzone’s
terms, there is indeed a severe constitutional problem with the Senate
Republicans’ plan: they are “asserting, in effect, a new constitutional
power, which has never before been exercised in U.S. history.”54 If the
historical tradition and respect for precedent—of which the Chief
Justice speaks—are to be taken at all seriously, “then Senate
Republicans lack[] this asserted power.”55
The product of an unprecedented, unconstitutional, and, in this
sense, unlawful process is itself unlawful or—to use a term with
perhaps greater currency: “illegitimate.” The nomination and
appointment of Neil Gorsuch—to the seat denied to Merrick
Garland—was thus the illegitimate product of an unprecedented,
unconstitutional, and, in that sense, unlawful process. It follows that
Justice Gorsuch’s tenure at the Supreme Court is, in that sense, of
doubtful legitimacy, along with all of his opinions and all decisions in
which he provides the deciding vote.56 This “aura of illegitimacy,” this

52

53

54
55
56

Kar & Mazzone, supra note 25, at 72, 99; cf. id. at 100 (“By construing its
‘advice and consent’ powers to give it this new divestment power, Senate
Republicans are therefore asserting, in effect, a new constitutional power, which
has never before been exercised in U.S. history. If the historical tradition that we
have uncovered has ripened into a constitutional rule, then Senate Republicans
lacks [sic] this asserted power.”).
Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 549 (2012) (quoting Free
Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 505 (2010)).
Kar & Mazzone, supra note 25, at 100.
Id.
See, e.g., Elizabeth Dias & Sydney Ember, G.O.P. Tactics in 2016 Pay Off in
Gorsuch, Who Proves Decisive Figure, N.Y. TIMES, June 27, 2018, at A17
(“The consequences of President Trump’s nomination of Neil M. Gorsuch to the
Supreme Court—and the Republican blockade of President Barack Obama’s
nomination of Merrick B. Garland in 2016 for that seat—became powerfully
clear on Tuesday after the court’s conservative majority handed down major
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enduring taint on the Court’s reputation, is unlikely to recede anytime
soon—at least not until Justice Gorsuch is gone and forgotten.
Finally, in 2018, with the retirement and replacement of Justice
Kennedy, the tactics surrounding Justice Scalia’s successor have come
full circle. The Court conservatives now appear to have attained—with
two appointments—exactly what the Court liberals would, and should,
have attained with the appointment of Merrick Garland alone: a fivevote majority—without Justice Kennedy—that could prevail
indefinitely.57
B. Relitigating the Rules of a Presidential Election
Suppose your local Police Chief calls a press conference and
announces:
I’m here to update you on an important investigation. First, I’m
going to include more detail about our process than I ordinarily
would, because I think the people of this town deserve those details
in a case of intense public interest.
Although we did not find clear evidence that the subjects of our
inquiry intended to violate laws governing the handling of
classified information, there is evidence that they were extremely
careless in their handling of very sensitive, highly classified
information.
In our system, the prosecutors make the decisions about whether
charges are appropriate based on evidence we help collect.
Although we don’t normally make public our recommendations to
the prosecutors, in this case, given the importance of the matter, I
think unusual transparency is in order.

57

decisions to uphold Mr. Trump’s travel ban and in favor of abortion rights
opponents.”).
In a kind of coda, garlanded with apparently unappreciated irony, Professor
Akhil Reed Amar has championed Judge Brett Kavanaugh’s nomination for the
Kennedy seat:
[W]ith the exception of the current justices and Judge Garland, it is
hard to name anyone with judicial credentials as strong as those of
Judge Kavanaugh . . . .
....
Except for Judge Garland, no one has sent more of his law
clerks to clerk for the justices of the Supreme Court than Judge
Kavanaugh has.
Akhil Reed Amar, Opinion, A Liberal’s Case for Brett Kavanaugh, N.Y. TIMES,
July 10, 2018.
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Although there is evidence of potential violations of the statutes
regarding the handling of classified information, our judgment is
that no reasonable prosecutor would bring such a case.
As a result, although the District Attorney’s office makes final
decisions on matters like this, we are expressing to the District
Attorney our view that no charges are appropriate in this case.

That is essentially what James Comey, Director of the Federal Bureau
of Investigation (“FBI”), said and did at a press conference he called
on July 5, 2016, a few months before the upcoming presidential
election.58 Of course, the “subjects of the inquiry” were former
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and her colleagues at the
Department of State.
Here is some background information. The Department of Justice
and the FBI began an investigation in July 2015 into former Secretary
Clinton’s use of a private email server.59 By the spring of 2016, FBI
Director Comey and his investigators had determined that the evidence
did not support a criminal prosecution.60 Although a number of
persons participated in drafting the July 5, 2016 press conference
statement, Comey himself added the following gloss, just a few days
in advance; the tone is supremely confident, almost defiant, as if he is
letting the American people in on a secret that his superiors at the
Justice Department might not approve of:
This will be an unusual statement in at least a couple ways. First, I
am going to include more detail about our process than I ordinarily
would, because I think the American people deserve those details
in a case of intense public interest. Second, I have not coordinated
or reviewed this statement in any way with the Department of
Justice or any other part of the government. They do not know what
I am about to say.61

In fact, his superiors were not pleased. In a subsequent
investigation of the investigation, conducted by the Justice
58

59

60
61

Press Release, James B. Comey, F.B.I. Dir., Statement on the Investigation of
Secretary Hillary Clinton’s Use of a Personal E-Mail System (July 5, 2016),
https://www.fbi.gov/news/pressrel/press-releases/statement-by-fbi-directorjames-b-comey-on-the-investigation-of-secretary-hillary-clinton2019s-use-of-apersonal-e-mail-system [https://perma.cc/5YQH-C4BN].
OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, A REVIEW OF VARIOUS
ACTIONS BY THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION AND DEPARTMENT OF
JUSTICE IN ADVANCE OF THE 2016 ELECTION 1 (2018) [hereinafter O.I.G.
REPORT].
Id. at iii.
Press Release, James B. Comey, supra note 58 (emphasis added).
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Department’s Office of the Inspector General (“O.I.G. Report”),
Comey is faulted mainly for two things, the first of which is essentially
hubris:
Comey’s decision to make this statement was the result of his
belief that only he had the ability to credibly and authoritatively
convey the rationale for the decision to not seek charges against
Clinton, and that he needed to hold the press conference to protect
the FBI and the Department from the extraordinary harm that he
believed would have resulted had he failed to do so.62

Second, Comey is faulted for violating both the written and unwritten
rules of the Department of Justice: “Comey’s unilateral announcement
was inconsistent with Department policy and violated long-standing
Department practice and protocol by, among other things, criticizing
Clinton’s uncharged conduct. Comey [also] usurped the authority of
the Attorney General . . . .”63
The FBI investigation into Secretary Clinton’s use of a private
email server took a number of peculiar twists and turns, but a few
general observations may be ventured. First, the so-called “email
scandal” was largely a made-up, political controversy.64 There is a
simple and blindingly obvious explanation for Secretary Clinton’s
unusual email practices: the personal information-technology available
to federal government employees (especially in a bureaucracy as vast
as the State Department) is chronically inferior to that available in the
private sector.65 This is not an excuse for Secretary Clinton’s
unsatisfactory solution (the use of a private email server that was not
continuously monitored),66 but it is an explanation. Reportedly, both
Director Comey and even President Trump have sometimes failed to
62
63
64

65

66

O.I.G. REPORT, supra note 59, at vi (emphasis added).
Id.
Cf. LANNY J. DAVIS, THE UNMAKING OF THE PRESIDENT 2016, 7 (2018)
(discussing Secretary Clinton’s experience with media and Republicans’ feeding
frenzies during Whitewater).
I can personally attest to this as a former Summer Law Intern at the Department
of Justice and a Law Clerk to a Federal Appeals Court Judge. For an extended
period of time, the Department of Justice was pursuing an antitrust case against
Microsoft Corp. It apparently did not behoove the Justice Department to make
use of Microsoft programs, products, or software in its offices while pursuing
this litigation. This could partly explain the limited and outdated choices of
information technology available in federal agencies over an extended period of
time.
See Press Release, James B. Comey, supra note 58.
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use their cumbersome but secure government-issued devices for
conducting official business.67 So much for consistency.
The FBI bears approximately the same relationship to the
Department of Justice as the Police Chief, in my example above, does
to the District Attorney’s office. It would be just as odd for the Police
Chief to announce (at his public press conference) that “no reasonable
prosecutor would bring such a case,” as it was for Director Comey to
do so in similar circumstances. Neither are prosecutors, reasonable or
otherwise, so it is odd for them even to be pronouncing on what a
prosecutor would or would not do. It is as if a defense attorney (in a
case tried before a judge) were to announce in open court that “No
reasonable judge would hold against my client.” It would be even
odder for these statements about “reasonable prosecutors” to be made
without coordinating with or even informing the prosecutors
themselves, which Director Comey did not do. According to the O.I.G.
Report: “Comey acknowledged that he made a conscious decision not
to tell Department leadership about his plans to make a separate
statement because he was concerned that they would instruct him not
to do it.”68 The Report “found that it was extraordinary and
insubordinate for Comey to do so, and . . . found none of his reasons to
be a persuasive basis for deviating from well-established Department
policies . . . .”69

67

See, e.g., Eliana Johnson et al., ‘Too Inconvenient’: Trump Goes Rogue on
Phone Security, POLITICO (May 21, 2018, 7:00 PM), https://www.politico.com/
story/2018/05/21/trump-phone-security-risk-hackers-601903
[https://perma.cc/FG6H-57FA]. The article reported that:
President Donald Trump uses a White House cellphone that isn’t
equipped with sophisticated security features designed to shield his
communications, according to two senior administration
officials—a departure from the practice of his predecessors that
potentially exposes him to hacking or surveillance . . . . Trump
campaigned in part on his denunciations of Hillary Clinton’s use of
a private email server as secretary of state—a system that made
classified information vulnerable to hacking by hostile actors.

68

69

Id.; see also O.I.G. REPORT, supra note 59, at xii (“[W]e learned during the
course of our review that Comey, Strzok, and Page used their personal email
accounts to conduct FBI business.”).
O.I.G. REPORT, supra note 59, at v. I.e., if the answer is likely to be “No,” don’t
ask. As a small child, I found this defense surprisingly underappreciated.
Id.
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Saying that Secretary Clinton was “extremely careless”70 with her
email practices, but not charging her with anything, would be like the
Police Chief’s pulling someone over for driving “extremely
recklessly” but not ticketing him. Since Secretary Clinton was a
leading presidential candidate, Director Comey might also, in all
fairness (and in the interest of “transparency”), have announced that
Donald Trump was likewise under investigation for “extremely
suspicious” evidence of illegal election collusion with the Russian
government—but that he had not (yet) been charged with anything
either. Needless to say, those would have been far more serious
allegations; yet they were never brought up by the FBI (or the Justice
Department, or the President) in any public forum, at any time before
the election. So much for fairness (and “transparency”).71
In a strange way, the July 5, 2016 press conference—unfortunate
as it was—set off a series of far-reaching reverberations that were to
have far worse and more profound effects later. The initial reactions
70
71

Press Release, James B. Comey, supra note 58.
See, e.g., Matt Apuzzo et al., In Trying To Avoid Politics, Comey Shaped an
Election, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 23, 2017, at A1.
[W]ith polls showing Mrs. Clinton holding a comfortable lead, Mr.
Comey ended up plunging the F.B.I. into the molten center of a
bitter election. Fearing the backlash that would come if it were
revealed after the election that the F.B.I. had been investigating the
next president and had kept it a secret, Mr. Comey sent a letter
informing Congress that the case was reopened.
What he did not say was that the F.B.I. was also investigating
the campaign of Donald J. Trump. Just weeks before, Mr. Comey
had declined to answer a question from Congress about whether
there was such an investigation.
....
. . . Mr. Comey’s approach to the two investigations . . .
[differed] starkly . . . . In the case of Mrs. Clinton, he rewrote the
script, partly based on the F.B.I.’s expectation that she would win
and fearing the bureau would be accused of helping her. In the case
of Mr. Trump, he conducted the investigation by the book, with the
F.B.I.’s traditional secrecy . . . .
Mr. Comey made those decisions with the supreme selfconfidence of a former prosecutor who, in a distinguished career,
has cultivated a reputation for what supporters see as fierce
independence, and detractors view as media-savvy arrogance.
Id.
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were bad enough. Legal commentators and the Trump campaign
seized on the language of “extremely careless,” which came perilously
close to the statutory, criminal element of “gross negligence.” Mr.
Trump made the most of this, and chants of “Lock her up!” pervaded
the remainder of his election campaign. The deeper significance of
Director Comey’s press conference was not evident until much later,
when in light of subsequent events it began to represent—in James
Comey’s mind above all—a mistake that had to be corrected at all
costs.
Faced with a complicated series of events, it is always hard to
single out just those that were truly necessary to the outcome.72
Theoretically, the list could be infinite.73 Perhaps a butterfly in
72

73

See, e.g., H. L. A. HART & TONY HONORÉ, CAUSATION IN THE LAW 40–44 (2d
ed. 1985) (arguing that, at times, we attempt to trace causes and effects through
voluntary action and abnormal occurrences to no avail).
On the “Butterfly Effect,” see, for example, Edward N. Lorenz, Deterministic
Nonperiodic Flow, 20 J. ATMOSPHERIC SCI. 130, 140–41 (1963); Edward N.
Lorenz, The Predictability of Hydrodynamic Flow, 25 TRANSACTIONS N.Y.
ACAD. SCI. 409 (1963). In The Predictability of Hydrodynamic Flow, Lorenz
describes his research:
During the course of this investigation we encountered a rather
striking phenomenon. At various times we found it desirable to
repeat portions of previous computations. For this purpose we took
the values which the machine had printed at one particular time
step, and entered these values into the machine as new initial
conditions. Sometimes the machine did not repeat its previous
performance. Fairly soon, small differences between the solutions
would appear, and these would grow until eventually there was no
resemblance between the two solutions.
The cause of the initial discrepancies was soon evident. The
numbers had been carried in the machine to six significant figures,
but only three figures had been printed in the output. The new
initial values had thus been rounded off to three figures, and we
were unwittingly superposing a small disturbance upon the earlier
conditions. In comparing the two solutions, we were observing the
growth of a small disturbance . . . .
....
This result had obvious implications for the atmosphere, in
view of the inevitable inaccuracies of observed initial conditions. It
suggested that two indistinguishable states could eventually evolve
into entirely different states, and that a long-range prediction
would fail completely in at least one instance.
....
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northern Alaska might have noticed an especially bright and appealing
flower and flapped its wings a little harder to investigate, setting off a
barely perceptible air current which, when combined in just the right
way with other, seemingly random currents of air, could contribute to
an eventual strengthening of the air flow across the entire North
American continent, across the North Atlantic Ocean, and into the
Middle East. This theoretically-increased air flow could have a
decisive effect on tremendous air currents that generally follow a path
south of the Himalayas, but would now be pushed into the northern
route, setting off major atmospheric changes worldwide.74 These
atmospheric conditions could have impacted Arizona in June of 2016,
where devastating tornados might have crisscrossed the state, such that
Attorney General Lynch’s airplane—which was heading for Phoenix
at the time—might have been diverted, and a fateful meeting with
former President Bill Clinton might never have taken place.
The butterfly in northern Alaska, however, looked the other way,
never saw the appealing flower, and the theoretical exercise in
meteorological conditions did not play out as it might have. The
weather in Arizona was calm and clear, and former President Clinton
found his plane on the same tarmac as Attorney General Lynch’s.
President Clinton saw no reason not to board the Attorney General’s
plane unexpectedly, for a friendly chat (even as his wife was under
investigation by the FBI and the Justice Department). For James
Comey, this incident “tipped the scales” in his decision to hold the
press conference on his own, without bringing the compromised
Attorney General into the fold.75
. . . One meteorologist remarked that if the theory were correct,
one flap of a sea gull’s wings would be enough to alter the course
of the weather forever. The controversy has not yet been settled,
but the most recent evidence seems to favor the sea gulls.

74

75

Id. at 423–24, 431; see also Ray Bradbury, A Sound of Thunder, COLLIER’S,
June 28, 1952, at 20, 60. (Could the result of a U.S. presidential election turn on
what happened to a little butterfly sixty million years ago?).
See, e.g., Judah L. Cohen et al., Arctic Warming, Increasing Snow Cover and
Widespread Boreal Winter Cooling, 7 ENVTL. RES. LETTERS 1, 5, 6 (2012);
Judah Cohen & Justin Jones, Tropospheric Precursors and Stratospheric
Warmings, 24 J. CLIMATE 6562, 6562–63, 6570 (2011); Judah Cohen et al.,
Winter 2009–2010: A Case Study of an Extreme Arctic Oscillation Event, 37
GEOPHYSICAL RES. LETTERS 1, 1 (2010); Judah Cohen et al., Decadal
Fluctuations in Planetary Wave Forcing Modulate Global Warming in Late
Boreal Winter, 22 J. CLIMATE 4418, 4425 (2009).
See O.I.G. REPORT, supra note 59, at v, 242–43.
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Another series of “necessary causes” began with the investigation
of electronic devices used by Secretary Clinton and her senior staff
aides. In the Clinton investigation—unlike the Trump-Russia
investigation—Director Comey and his investigators were not looking
primarily for a “smoking gun.”76 They provisionally accepted
Secretary Clinton as the hard-working, patriotic, head of an unwieldy,
far-flung agency who truly believed she could not do her job with the
information technology provided by the government. (All of her
predecessors—in the “computer age” at least—came to the same
conclusion.) The fact that her solution fell short of the governing
standards presumptively reflected the mens rea not of a treasonous spy
but of a harried and impatient administrator.77 Thus, the investigators
were looking primarily for a “pattern of practice.” “They stated that
they discovered persistent practices of State Department employees,
including both political and career employees, discussing classified
information on both unclassified government email accounts and
personal email accounts, and that this culture predated Clinton’s tenure
as Secretary of State.”78 Even a representative sample of Secretary
Clinton’s practices could provide sufficient evidence of her failure to
follow “best practices.”
Practical limits were also placed on the scope of the investigation
from the very beginning:
[A]t the outset of the investigation, former Deputy Director [Mark
F.] Giuliano generally advised the team that the purpose of the
investigation was not to follow every potential lead of classified
information . . . . Giuliano told the team, “[T]his is not going to
become some octopus . . . . The focus of the investigation [is] the
appearance of classified information on [Clinton’s] personal emails
and that server during the time she was Secretary of
State.” . . . [T]he FBI’s “purpose and mission” was not to pursue
“spilled [classified] information to the ends of the earth.”79

Likewise, “in the beginning of the investigation, the Midyear team
wanted to obtain every device that touched the server, but . . . over
76
77
78
79

See id. at 324, 368.
See id. at 165–66.
Id. at 95.
Id. at 93 (alterations to internal quotations in original); see also id. at 95 (“I
think the idea was that, that this investigation had to be somewhat focused,
otherwise it could spin off into a million different directions. And this
investigation could take different forms for years and years and years to come.
So, you know, the, the focus of the investigation was, was really the private
email system.”).
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time the team realized that this would not be ‘fruitful.’ . . . OTD
personnel told the team that ‘it was not likely that there would be
anything on the devices’ themselves.”80
Perhaps most significantly, the team of investigators:
Did not seek to obtain every device, including those of Clinton’s
senior aides, or the contents of every email account through which
a classified email may have traversed . . . . [T]he reasons for not
doing so were based on limitations . . . imposed on the
investigation’s scope, the desire to complete the investigation well
before the election, and the belief that the foregone evidence was
likely of limited value.81

Thus, for example:
The Midyear team obtained 2703(d) orders for noncontent
information in Mills’s Gmail account and Abedin’s Yahoo!
account and a search warrant for Sullivan’s personal Gmail
account. However, the Midyear team did not obtain search
warrants to examine the content of emails in Mills’s or Abedin’s
private email accounts and did not seek to obtain any of the senior
aides’ personal devices.82

Specifically, “the investigators did not seek access to the private
devices used by Sullivan, Mills, or Abedin during Clinton’s tenure at
State.”83
Since the FBI did not systematically round up all electronic
devices that could possibly have been used by Secretary Clinton’s staff
to send and receive messages from her, it left itself open and
vulnerable to the pure workings of chance. Again, perhaps another
butterfly in northern Alaska might have noticed an especially bright
and appealing flower and flapped its wings a little harder to
investigate, setting off a barely perceptible air current which, when
combined in just the right way with other, seemingly random currents
of air, could contribute to an eventual strengthening of the air flow
across the entire North American continent, such that it could have
80
81
82

83

Id. at 94.
Id. at ii (emphasis added).
Id. at 90 (emphasis added); see also id. at 93 (“Generally the witnesses told us
that they could not remember anyone within the team arguing that more should
have been done to obtain the senior aides’ devices.”).
Id. at 93; see also id. at 94 (“[T]he Midyear team asked Abedin whether she
backed up her clintonemail.com emails and she responded that her email was
‘cloud-based’ and she did not ‘know how to back up her archives.’ . . . [B]ased
on this testimony, the team assessed that finding helpful evidence on Abedin’s
devices was unlikely.”). Id.
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rained every day that week in North Carolina, where after high school,
a pretty young cheerleader might have been waiting forlornly in the
rain for a bus, when the captain of the football team pulled up in his
sports car and offered her a ride home, after which he asked her out on
a date that weekend, which she gladly accepted, as she already had a
bit of a crush on him. She might very well have resolved—then and
there—never again to communicate with “that creep Anthony
Weiner,” deleted all messages on her computer and phone to and from
him, and changed her email address and phone number, so that she
never heard from him again.
As it was, however, the butterfly in northern Alaska looked the
other way and never saw the appealing flower. The weather was bright
and sunny all that week in North Carolina, so the pretty young
cheerleader walked home from school instead of waiting for the bus,
and never saw the captain of the football team. That weekend—
without any dates—she had nothing better to do than send and receive
increasingly explicit computer messages to and from Anthony Weiner,
who was eventually arrested by the criminal authorities, and whose
laptop computer was impounded and turned over to the FBI in late
September, 2016.
And lo and behold, on that very laptop were hundreds of thousands
of emails to and from Secretary Clinton and one of her senior aides,
Huma Abedin, Secretary Clinton’s Deputy Chief of Staff, who
happened to be Anthony Weiner’s estranged wife, from whom he
happened to have “inherited” his laptop computer.84
This should have been no surprise to anyone at the FBI. Since the
electronic devices of Secretary Clinton’s staff had not all been
systematically collected and reviewed, it should be no surprise to have
one turn up later. But this put Director Comey in a particular, selfinflicted bind. Now he had, not one, but two of his own mistakes to
correct.
First was the mistake of assuring the American public that the
Clinton email investigation was definitively “over and done with,” that
all relevant evidence had been reviewed and found wanting, and that
no indictments could possibly come down. That was not necessarily
true, as Anthony Weiner inadvertently proved. The fact that it could so
easily be disproved reflected Director Comey’s second mistake. (How
hard could it have been to round up all electronic devices of Secretary
Clinton’s staff, including those jointly used by family members?)
84

Id. at 306–07.
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A standard, one-sentence “Declination of Prosecution” notice from
the Justice Department would have had none of the broader
implications that Director Comey’s press conference introduced,
which would haunt him later. The discovery of additional emails, or
even an additional device, in the Clinton investigation should not have
surprised or alarmed anyone, since there had been no effort to round
up all of those emails and devices anyway, even those of Clinton’s
senior aides. Indeed, as one prosecutor stated, “the only reason the FBI
later obtained the Weiner laptop was because ‘it had ended up in our
laps.’”85 However, Anthony Weiner’s laptop computer then sat
unexamined for nearly a month in a queue for processing evidence at
the FBI.86 No one thought it necessary to notify Director Comey.
Whether the laptop was processed before or after the election was of
no particular concern.87
But, for Director Comey, once he found out about the additional,
hundreds of thousands of emails on October 27, 2016, this
immediately became a matter of tremendous, self-imposed concern.
He viewed the American public as going to the polls under false
pretenses—false pretenses that he himself had wrongly set in place,
with his assurances at the press conference. Those assurances of
extraordinary “transparency” and of a definitively closed Clinton email
investigation were no longer necessarily true (even though, given the
unsystematic collection of the Clinton emails, the additional emails
were not considered significant even by Director Comey’s own
investigators).
Director Comey’s own, distinctly personal bind, his perceived need
to set the record—his record—absolutely straight, at all costs (and in
85
86

87

Id. at 95.
See id. at vii–viii (The emails were discovered on the laptop on September 26,
2016, but “no evidence that anyone associated with the Midyear investigation,
including the entire leadership team at FBI Headquarters, took any action on the
Weiner laptop issue until the week of October 24.”); see also William Saletan,
Unread October: The FBI Ignored Anthony Weiner’s Laptop. That May Have
Cost Hillary Clinton the Election., SLATE (June 14, 2018, 11:24 PM),
https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2018/06/fbi-ignored-anthony-weinerslaptop-and-it-may-have-cost-hillary-clinton-the-election.html
[https://perma.cc/7EVA-AVME].
See Saletan, supra note 86; see also O.I.G. REPORT, supra note 59, at 330 (“The
FBI’s neglect had potentially far-reaching consequences. Comey told the OIG
that, had he known about the laptop in the beginning of October and thought the
email review could have been completed before the election, it may have
affected his decision to notify Congress.”).
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so doing to correct his own, self-inflicted mistakes), took precedence—for him—over both the written and unwritten rules of a
presidential election.88 These self-imposed concerns seemed
increasingly to have taken on the dimensions—if not the form—of a
great, white whale for the beleaguered, preoccupied Captain Comey:
The White Whale swam before him as the monomaniac
incarnation of all those malicious agencies which some deep men
feel eating in them, till they are left living on with half a heart and
half a lung. That intangible malignity which has been from the
beginning; to whose dominion even the modern Christians ascribe
one-half of the worlds; which the ancient Ophites of the east
reverenced in their statue devil;—Ahab did not fall down and
worship it like them; but deliriously transferring its idea to the
abhorred white whale, he pitted himself, all mutilated, against it.
All that most maddens and torments; all that stirs up the lees of
things; all truth with malice in it; all that cracks the sinews and
cakes the brain; all the subtle demonisms of life and thought; all
evil, to crazy Ahab, were visibly personified, and made practically
assailable in Moby-Dick. He piled upon the whale’s white hump
the sum of all the general rage and hate felt by his whole race from
Adam down; and then, as if his chest had been a mortar, he burst
his hot heart’s shell upon it.
. . . But, as in his narrow-flowing monomania, not one jot of
Ahab’s broad madness had been left behind; so in that broad
madness, not one jot of his great natural intellect had perished.
That before living agent, now became the living instrument. If such
a furious trope may stand, his special lunacy stormed his general
sanity, and carried it, and turned all its concentred cannon upon its
own mad mark; so that far from having lost his strength, Ahab, to
that one end, did now possess a thousandfold more potency than
88

See O.I.G. REPORT, supra note 59, at 372–73. Director Comey’s preoccupation
with setting the record straight ran counter to the standards of his profession:
[T]he problem originated with Comey’s elevation of “maximal
transparency” as a value overriding, for this case only, the
principles of “stay silent” and “take no action” that the FBI has
consistently applied to other cases. The Department [of Justice]
and the FBI do not practice “maximal transparency” in criminal
investigations. It is not a value reflected in the regulations,
policies, or customs guiding FBI actions in pending criminal
investigations. To the contrary, the guidance to agents and
prosecutors is precisely the opposite—no transparency except in
rare and exceptional circumstances due to the potential harm to
both the investigation and to the reputation of anyone under
investigation.
Id. at 373.
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ever he had sanely brought to bear upon any one reasonable
object.89

89

HERMAN MELVILLE, MOBY-DICK 163–65 (Raymond M. Weaver ed., Albert &
Charles Boni, Inc. 1925) (1851).
But be all this as it may, certain it is, that with the mad secret of
his unabated rage bolted up and keyed in him, Ahab had purposely
sailed upon the present voyage with the one only and allengrossing object of hunting the White Whale . . . . He was intent
on an audacious, immitigable, and supernatural revenge.
Here, then, was this grey-headed, ungodly old man, chasing
with curses a Job’s whale round the world, at the head of a crew,
too, chiefly made up of mongrel renegades, and castaways, and
cannibals . . . . Such a crew, so officered, seemed specially picked
and packed by some infernal fatality to help him to his
monomaniac revenge.
....
. . . For with the charts of all four oceans before him, Ahab was
threading a maze of currents and eddies, with a view to the more
certain accomplishment of that monomaniac thought of his soul.
Id. at 166, 177.
Ah, God! what trances of torments does that man endure who is
consumed with one unachieved revengeful desire. He sleeps with
clenched hands; and wakes with his own bloody nails in his palms.
Often when forced from his hammock by exhausting and
intolerably vivid dreams of the night, which, resuming his own
intense thoughts through the day, carried them on amid a clashing
of phrensies, and whirled them round and round in his blazing
brain, till the very throbbing of his life-spot became insufferable
anguish; and when, as was sometimes the case, these spiritual
throes in him heaved his being up from its base, and a chasm
seemed opening in him, from which forked flames and lightnings
shot up, and accursed fiends beckoned him to leap down among
them; when this hell in himself yawned beneath him, a wild cry
would be heard through the ship; and with glaring eyes Ahab
would burst from his state room, as though escaping from a bed
that was on fire. Yet these, perhaps, instead of being the
unsuppressible symptoms of some latent weakness, or fright at his
own resolve, were but the plainest tokens of its intensity.
Id. at 180.
“Oh! thou clear spirit of clear fire, whom on these seas I as Persian
once did worship, till in the sacramental act so burned by thee, that
to this hour I bear the scar; I now know thee, thou clear spirit, and I
now know that thy right worship is defiance . . . . Oh, thou clear
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On October 28, 2016—over strenuous objections at all levels of
the Department of Justice—Director Comey notified the majority and
minority chairmen of all the relevant congressional committees as
follows:
In previous congressional testimony, I referred to the fact that
the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) had completed its
investigation of former Secretary Clinton’s personal email server.
Due to recent developments, I am writing to supplement my
previous testimony.
In connection with an unrelated case, the FBI has learned of the
existence of emails that appear to be pertinent to the investigation.
I am writing to inform you that the investigative team briefed me
on this yesterday, and I agreed that the FBI should take appropriate
investigative steps designed to allow investigators to review these
emails to determine whether they contain classified information, as
well as to assess their importance to our investigation.
Although the FBI cannot yet assess whether or not this material
may be significant, and I cannot predict how long it will take us to
complete this additional work, I believe it is important to update
your Committees about our efforts in light of my previous
testimony.90

That was eleven days before the election (at the height of early
voting).
Director Comey’s notification immediately threw the election into
complete chaos. An instantly re-energized Mr. Trump gleefully

spirit, of thy fire thou madest me, and like a true child of fire, I
breathe it back to thee.”
[Sudden, repeated flashes of lightning . . . .]
“ . . . There is some unsuffusing thing beyond thee, thou clear
spirit, to whom all thy eternity is but time, all thy creativeness
mechanical. Through thee, thy flaming self, my scorched eyes do
dimly see it. Oh, thou foundling fire, thou hermit immemorial, thou
too hast thy incommunicable riddle, thy unparticipated grief. Here
again with haughty agony, I read my sire. Leap! leap up, and lick
the sky! I leap with thee; I burn with thee; would fain be welded
with thee; defyingly I worship thee!”
90

Id. at 447–48 (first and third emphases added).
Letter from James B. Comey, Dir., Fed. Bureau of Investigation, to Cong.
Comm. Chairmen (Oct. 28, 2016) (on file with author) [hereinafter Oct. 28
Letter].
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pounced on the new information as “bigger than Watergate,”91 and
warned against electing a candidate who was clearly about to be
indicted.92 Double-digit percentage changes in voter sentiment were
soon detected in both state and national polling.93
As for Clinton, she viewed the Comey letter to Congress as
effectively ending her candidacy. It was, as she said later in a
conference call to donors, simply too much to “overcome.”94 In her
memoir, she recalls that when she and her aides heard where the new
emails came from:
Huma looked stricken. Anthony had already caused so much
heartache. And now this.
“This man is going to be the death of me,” she said, bursting
into tears.
....
. . . At the time, the FBI had no idea if the emails were new or
duplicates of ones already reviewed, or if they were personal or
work related, let alone whether they might be considered classified
retroactively or not. They didn’t know anything at all. And Comey
didn’t wait to learn more. He fired off his letter to Congress two
days before the FBI received a warrant to look at those emails.
Why make a public statement like this, which was bound to be
politically devastating, when the FBI itself couldn’t say whether
the new material was important in any way? At the very end of his
July 5 press conference, Comey had declared sanctimoniously,
91

92

93

94

Michelle Ye Hee Lee, Trump’s Bizarre Claim That the Clinton Email
Controversy Is ‘Bigger Than Watergate,’ WASH. POST (Oct. 30, 2016, 3:00
AM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/fact-checker/wp/2016/10/30/
trumps-bizarre-claim-that-the-clinton-email-controversy-is-bigger-thanwatergate/ [https://perma.cc/S6LN-KNAQ].
See Chuck Todd et al., Trump Warned of Endless Clinton Investigations.
Instead, the Focus Is on Him, NBC NEWS (June 15, 2017, 8:30 AM), https://
www.nbcnews.com/politics/first-read/trump-warned-endless-investigationsclinton-instead-focus-him-n772736 [https://perma.cc/N9YE-APP5].
Cf. Nate Cohn, Did Comey Cost Clinton the Election? Why We’ll Never Know,
N.Y. TIMES (June 14, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/14/upshot/didcomey-cost-clinton-the-election-why-well-never-know.html
[https://perma.cc/GUF5-6LQL] (arguing evidence from the polls in October
2016 remains inconclusive as to the Comey effect on Clinton’s decline in
support).
Clinton Blames FBI’s Comey for Her Presidential Election Defeat, VOA NEWS
(Nov. 12, 2016, 7:23 PM), https://www.voanews.com/usa/us-politics/clintonblames-fbis-comey-her-presidential-election-defeat
[https://perma.cc/9AX4T4YF].
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“Only facts matter,” but here the FBI didn’t know the facts and
didn’t let that stop it from throwing the presidential election into
chaos.95

Clinton was right. On the Sunday afternoon two days before
Election Day (after early voting had mostly ended), Director Comey
sent a second notification to all the same congressional committee
chairs and co-chairs, essentially saying “never mind.”
I write to supplement my October 28, 2016 letter that notified
you the FBI would be taking additional investigative steps with
respect to former Secretary of State Clinton’s use of a personal
email server. Since my letter, the FBI investigative team has been
working around the clock to process and review a large volume of
emails from a device obtained in connection with an unrelated
criminal investigation. During that process, we reviewed all of the
communications that were to or from Hillary Clinton while she
was Secretary of State.
Based on our review, we have not changed our conclusions that
we expressed in July with respect to Secretary Clinton.96

All the apparently “pertinent” emails on Weiner’s laptop were copies
or backed-up versions of emails from Abedin’s accounts, which were
already well known to investigators.97 There was nothing new or
relevant. But, “[b]y then it was too late,” writes Secretary Clinton. “If
anything, that second letter may have energized Trump supporters
even more and made them more likely to turn out and vote against me.
It also guaranteed that undecided voters saw two more days of
headlines about emails and investigations.”98
With his statements and actions, Director Comey violated many of
the written and unwritten rules of a presidential election. The
determination of the Justice Department’s Office of the Inspector
General (“O.I.G.”), that Director Comey’s press conference statement
“was inconsistent with Department policy and violated long-standing
Department practice and protocol,” has already been discussed—as
well as his usurpation of the Attorney General’s authority, which the
O.I.G. found “extraordinary and insubordinate” and a “deviati[on]
from well-established Department policies.”99
95
96

97
98
99

HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON, WHAT HAPPENED 314–15 (2017).
Letter from James B. Comey, Dir., Fed. Bureau of Investigation, to Cong.
Comm. Chairmen (Nov. 6, 2016) (on file with author).
See Oct. 28 Letter, supra note 90.
CLINTON, supra note 95, at 405.
O.I.G. REPORT, supra note 59, at v, vi.
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The Department of Justice (of which the FBI is a part) and its
prosecutors and investigators observe a “quiet period” (of at least sixty
days) prior to an election, during which sensitive information is not
publicly released.100 This unwritten rule is presumptively to be
observed unless there is a very good reason to the contrary. The voting
public needs time to process and “digest” news, to put it into
perspective before an election. Emotionally charged, last-minute
revelations may not fulfill their dire potential when reassessed in the
cold morning light of counter-arguments and further developments.
“Quiet” does not mean “cover-up” though, as Deputy Attorney
General Rod Rosenstein has explained. “When federal agents and
prosecutors quietly open a criminal investigation, we are not
concealing anything; we are simply following the longstanding policy
that we refrain from publicizing non-public information. In that
context, silence is not concealment.”101
The timing of FBI Director Comey’s October 28th “surprise” was
dictated by the actions of a child molester, by his own Bureau’s
negligence (in sitting on the new evidence for a month), and by his
own personal promises of extraordinary “transparency.” None of these
was a good reason for departing from the “quiet period” policy,
especially considering that no one even knew the nature of the “new”
evidence. As the O.I.G. Report somewhat delicately put it:
[W]e found . . . that the Midyear team:
....
Did not seek to obtain every device, including those of
Clinton’s senior aides, or the contents of every email account
through which a classified email may have traversed . . . . We
further found that [this was], in part, in tension with Comey’s
response in October 2016 to the discovery of Clinton emails on the
laptop of Anthony Weiner . . . .102

Yet Comey might have reasoned to himself: “If I wait two more days
for a search warrant, that would be only nine days before the election.
And if I wait two more days to assess the hundreds of thousands of
100

101

102

See Josh Meyer, Anticipation Builds Around Mueller as 60-Day Election
Window Nears, POLITICO (Aug. 30, 2018, 6:54 PM), https:// www.politico.com/
story/2018/08/30/mueller-midterms-russia-probe-election-window-805491
[https://perma.cc/5YW2-VGHX].
Memorandum from Rod J. Rosenstein, Deputy Att’y Gen., Dep’t of Justice, to
the Att’y Gen. 2 (May 9, 2017) (on file with author).
O.I.G. REPORT, supra note 59, at ii (emphasis added).
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emails, that would be only seven days before the election.” So he
rolled the dice with what little he knew—only to “unroll” them later,
two days before the election.
But as everyone knows, dice cannot really be unrolled any more
than the genie can be put back into her bottle. Irreparable damage to
the legitimacy of the election had, quite predictably, already been
done.
The Department of Justice, like other federal agencies, is subject to
applicable provisions of the Hatch Act.103 The very first provision
states: “(a) Subject to the provisions of subsection (b), an employee
may take an active part in political management or in political
campaigns, except an employee may not—
(1) use his official authority or influence for the purpose of
interfering with or affecting the result of an election.”104

One commentator writes that: “the Hatch Act . . . proscribes acting
with improper ‘purpose’ to influence an election and in engaging in
certain discrete partisan activities like receiving political contributions.
It has little direct application here, where there is no evidence
indicating that Comey acted with any improper purpose.”105 Let’s
examine that proposition.

103

104
105

An Act to Prevent Pernicious Political Activities (Hatch Act), 5 U.S.C. §§ 7321–
7326 (2020).
§ 7323(a)(1) (emphasis added).
Jane Chong, Pre-Election Disclosures: How Does, and Should, DOJ Analyze
Edge Cases?, LAWFARE (Nov. 8, 2016, 9:10 AM) (emphasis added),
https://www.lawfareblog.com/pre-election-disclosures-how-does-and-shoulddoj-analyze-edge-cases [https://perma.cc/U469-YQE3]; see also David Cole,
What James Comey Did, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Dec. 8, 2016. Cole argues:
Whatever else one might say about the just-concluded 2016
presidential election, one thing is certain: FBI Director James
Comey played an outsized and exceptionally inappropriate part.
....
. . . [H]is October 28 announcement dramatically shifted the
trajectory of the campaign, deflected attention from Donald
Trump’s own considerable troubles, and inevitably influenced the
choices of many early voters.
....
. . . Comey’s October 28 announcement certainly affected the
results of the 2016 election, but there is no evidence that he took
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There is no direct evidence that Director Comey intended to
change the result of the 2016 presidential election. In this context that
would mean: intervening in the election, intending for the result to
differ (i.e., for a different candidate to win) from what it would have
been without the intervention. If that had been Director Comey’s
“purpose,” he would indeed have been acting with an “improper
purpose.” But the Hatch Act requires only that he not act “for the
purpose of interfering with or affecting the result of an election.”106 So
the question is not whether Director Comey intended to change the
result of the 2016 election, but only whether he intended to “affect”
the result of the election. One can affect the result of an election
without changing the result, e.g., by voting.
Director Comey certainly knew that his intervention(s) in the
election would affect its result. “[A]s any remotely sentient observer
could have predicted,” writes Jeffrey Toobin, “his interjection created
a sensation that was damaging to Clinton’s chances.”107 Yet, that still
speaks only indirectly to Director Comey’s purpose or intent. The
question might provisionally be put as: Did Director Comey intervene
in the 2016 election because he knew his intervention would affect the
result; or did he do so in spite of the fact that his intervention would
affect the result? According to standard legal doctrine, “A person is
presumed to intend the natural and probable consequences of his
voluntary acts.”108 But a presumption may be rebutted.
In the ancient legend, Icarus used a pair of improvised wings and
flew farther and higher than any man had ever done before. This was
exhilarating; this blinded him. Ultimately, despite all warnings, Icarus
flew too close to the sun; the wax securing his wings melted; and he
fell spiraling down into the sea and drowned.
Likewise, at a parlous and decisive moment in our history, much
depended on a man already predisposed to soaring flights of
independence bordering on authoritarianism—for which he had been
his action for that purpose, and absent such a motive, the Hatch
Act is not implicated.

106
107

108

Id. (emphasis added). “[I]nevitably,” I take it, carries the further
connotations of “predictably” and “foreseeably” in this context, which
bring into play the presumption of intent.
§ 7323(a)(1) (emphasis added).
Jeffrey Toobin, Clinton Investigation Mania, Part 2, NEW YORKER, (Nov. 6,
2016), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2016/11/14/clinton-investigationmania-part-two [http://perma.cc/KE3S-52QA].
Presumed Intent, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (5th ed. 1979).
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richly rewarded all his life, with positions of increasing authority and
discretion. This was exhilarating; this blinded him. So, faced with a
delicate situation that demanded finely-balanced certainties rather than
imponderable probabilities, he instead rolled the dice one time too
many and came crashing down into the perfect chaos his
miscalculation created for us all. The O.I.G. Report concludes that
“[as] with his July 5 announcement, [in making this decision to notify
Congress] Comey engaged in ad hoc decisionmaking based on his
personal views even if it meant rejecting longstanding Department
policy or practice . . . . [T]he burden was on him to justify an
extraordinary departure from these established norms, policies, and
precedent.”109
Burden-shifting is what presumptions are all about: the burden of
proof and the burden of producing evidence.110 Director Comey was
ultimately laboring under the burdens of two presumptions: (1) the
presumption that he intended to “affect” if not change the result of the
2016 election (which would have been “the natural and probable
consequence of his voluntary acts”111)—in notifying Congress as he
did; and (2) the presumption that the established norms, policies, and
precedent of the Department of Justice should be followed. Rebutting
these two presumptions would not be easy even under the best of
circumstances.
In his memoir, Director Comey gives his most considered defense.
He begins in a confessional tone: “I have many [flaws] . . . . I can be
stubborn, prideful, overconfident, and driven by ego. I’ve struggled
with those my whole life.”112 This is like the question in the job
interview when the interviewer asks what your “greatest weakness” is.
You are supposed to say something like: “Well, sometimes I probably
work too hard at my job.” So, Director Comey’s “flaws,” reported sua
sponte, may be assumed to be underestimated. In fact, 200 pages later,
he is still “struggling” with his ego and his pride: “I have long worried
about my ego . . . . [T]here is danger that all that pride can make me
blind . . .” (like Icarus).113
Director Comey’s main defense is as follows:
109
110

111
112
113

O.I.G. REPORT, supra note 59, at 371, 372.
See Charles W. Collier, The Improper Use of Presumptions in Recent Criminal
Law Adjudication, 38 STAN. L. REV. 423, 423 n.1 (1986).
Presumed Intent, supra note 108.
JAMES COMEY, A HIGHER LOYALTY, at x (2018).
Id. at 206.
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I had assumed from media polling that Hillary Clinton was going
to win. I have asked myself many times since if I was influenced
by that assumption. I don’t know. Certainly not consciously, but I
would be a fool to say it couldn’t have had an impact on me. It is
entirely possible that, because I was making decisions in an
environment where Hillary Clinton was sure to be the next
president, my concern about making her an illegitimate president
by concealing the restarted investigation bore greater weight than it
would have if the election appeared closer or if Donald Trump
were ahead in all polls. But I don’t know.114

If you point a loaded gun at my heart and pull the trigger, you are
presumed to want me dead, even if I survive. Charges of “assault with
a deadly weapon, attempted murder, etc.” will still lie, even if you
claim: “I was just attempting a citizen’s arrest. I thought he was
jaywalking, and I didn’t want him to get away.” (And if I die within a
year and a day, the charges are raised to murder at the common law.)
Director Comey figuratively pointed a loaded gun at the heart of
the Clinton campaign and pulled the trigger. He knew this would
“affect” the result of the election. Again, “as any remotely sentient
observer could have predicted, his interjection created a sensation that
was damaging to Clinton’s chances.”115 Director Comey also knew his
interjection might possibly even change the result of the election, such
that Mr. Trump would win. That was a chance he was willing to take.
But that was not a chance he was lawfully authorized to take.
Nowhere in the job description of FBI Director does it say that he
is “personally authorized and empowered to assure the ‘legitimacy’ (as
he sees it) of our elected Presidents—even if that means influencing
the results of elections and departing from the established norms,
policies, and precedent of the Department of Justice.” Nevertheless,
this was Director Comey’s justification to himself, as he intentionally
“affected” the result of the election and also knowingly took the
chance that he might possibly even change the result altogether. His
actions and statements thus fall well within the provision of the Hatch
Act prohibiting a federal employee from “us[ing] his official authority
or influence for the purpose of interfering with or affecting the result
of an election.”116 Director Comey’s considered “defense” does
nothing to rebut either of the two presumptions he was subject to.

114
115
116

Id. at 204 (emphasis added).
Toobin, Clinton Investigation Mania, Part 2, supra note 107.
5 U.S.C. § 7323(a)(1) (2020).
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In a lengthy article entitled The Comey Letter Probably Cost
Clinton the Election, acclaimed pollster and statistician Nate Silver
concludes:
Hillary Clinton would probably be president if FBI Director
James Comey had not sent a letter to Congress on Oct. 28. The
letter . . . upended the news cycle and soon halved Clinton’s lead in
the polls, imperiling her position in the Electoral College.
The letter isn’t the only reason that Clinton lost. It does not excuse
every decision the Clinton campaign made . . . .
But . . . [t]he impact of Comey’s letter is comparatively easy to
quantify, by contrast . . . . At a minimum, its impact might have
been only a percentage point or so. Still, because Clinton lost
Michigan, Pennsylvania and Wisconsin by less than 1 point, the
letter was probably enough to change the outcome of the Electoral
College.
....
So while one can debate the magnitude of the effect, there’s a
reasonably clear consensus of the evidence that the Comey letter
mattered—probably by enough to swing the election. This ought
not be one of the more controversial facts about the 2016
campaign; the data is pretty straightforward.117
117

Nate Silver, The Comey Letter Probably Cost Clinton the Election,
FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (May 3, 2017) (emphasis added) (footnote omitted),
https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/the-comey-letter-probably-cost-clinton-theelection/ [https://perma.cc/57ED-GZA5]; see also Kevin Drum, Let’s Talk
About Bubbles and James Comey, MOTHER JONES (Apr. 22, 2017),
https://www.motherjones.com/kevin-drum/2017/04/lets-talk-about-bubbles-andjames-comey/ [https://perma.cc/64SQ-RUDW].
[T]he Comey effect was real, it was big, and it probably cost
Clinton the election.
....
. . . Comey’s letter is unique for a few reasons. First, it was an
intervention by an institution that Americans have largely
perceived as nonpartisan. (Indeed, the FBI actively works to foster
that image.) Second, the intervention was almost perfectly timed to
impact Clinton at the worst time—dominating the final week of
campaigning as an unusually large number of undecided voters
made up their minds. Finally, it aligned perfectly with the narrative
pushed by Trump—and bolstered by the media’s obsessive
coverage of how Clinton handled her State Department email, and
the slow-drip release of hacked emails—that Clinton was somehow
fundamentally corrupt.
....
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“Perhaps the truest explanation of why things happened as they did is
the most ordinary,” writes James Fallows in another context: “that
human beings could not foresee the way that chance and circumstance
could magnify the consequences of their acts.”118
Ironically, the “aura of illegitimacy” that so concerned Director
Comey did, in fact, materialize; it simply enveloped a different
candidate. And it happened, not despite Director Comey’s best efforts,
but precisely because of them.

The effect of Comey’s late intervention into the election is also
clear in the national polls. As neuroscientist Sam Wang showed,
Clinton’s margin over Trump falls dramatically in national polls
directly after the Comey letter and never recovers. At the time,
statistician Nate Silver noted that the Comey letter coincided with
“a swing of about 3 points against her”—a massive swing in a tight
election. These public polls are supported by internal polling from
both campaigns suggesting that Comey was a massive blow to
Clinton at a pivotal moment in the election.
....
It’s true that there are other possible explanations for a late shift
in vote intentions, but thus far there is no alternative explanation of
merit. (The cyberhacks were surely important, but their effects
would have been felt more steadily throughout the campaign.)
Instead, the evidence is clear, and consistent, regarding the
Comey effect. The timing of the shift both at the state and national
levels lines up very neatly with the publication of the letter, as does
the predominance of the story in the media coverage from the final
week of the campaign. With an unusually large number of
undecided voters late in the campaign, the letter hugely increased
the salience of what was the defining critique of Clinton during the
campaign at its most critical moment.
....
. . . Comey broke a decades-long norm of not intervening in
presidential elections. The fact that his interference alone almost
certainly swayed an election is indicative of a broader and
disturbing breakdown of political norms.

118

Sean McElwee et al., 4 Pieces of Evidence Showing FBI Director James Comey
Cost Clinton the Election, VOX (Jan. 11, 2017, 9:40 AM),
https://www.vox.com/the-big-idea/2017/1/11/14215930/comey-email-electionclinton-campaign [https://perma.cc/5AZ5-6UU9].
James Fallows, M-16: A Bureaucratic Horror Story, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, June
1981, at 56, 65.
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II. THE AUTHORITARIAN PERSONALITY
[T]hey told me I was everything. ‘Tis a lie.
King Lear119

A. Present at the Destruction
Out of the rubble and ashes of World War II emerged a new world
order, and a new appreciation of the role played by psychological
factors in the social and political process. Former U.S. Secretary of
State Dean Acheson entitled his postwar memoir Present at the
Creation, as a metaphor for the task of reconstruction at war’s end,
which was “just a bit less formidable than that described in the first
chapter of Genesis. That was to create a world out of chaos; ours, to
create half a world, a free half, out of the same material without
blowing the whole to pieces in the process.”120 But how had so much
been reduced to rubble and ashes in the first place?
Many years earlier, in Munich, an unknown man of no
consequence arose at five o’clock in the morning. He had “gotten into
the habit of throwing pieces of bread or hard crusts to the little mice
which spent their time in the small room, and then to watch these droll
little animals romp and scuffle for these few delicacies.”121 For him,
watching the mice fight over bread crumbs was more than a sadistic
amusement. It was the Darwinian “struggle for existence,” playing out
on a small scale.
For the young Hitler, this formative experience helped to
rationalize and justify his overweening desire for power: it was
natural, rooted in the eternal laws of nature, and specifically in the
need for self-preservation—the primary motive of human behavior.
Even at this early stage, some of the defining features of the
authoritarian “world-view” may be discerned:
[T]he authoritarian person lives in a world which may be
conceived . . . as a sort of jungle in which man’s hand is
necessarily against every other man’s, in which the whole world is
conceived of as dangerous, threatening, or at least challenging, and
in which human beings are conceived of as primarily selfish or evil
or stupid. To carry the analogy further, this jungle is peopled with
animals who either eat or are eaten, who are either to be feared or
119
120
121

WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, KING LEAR act 4, sc. 6.
DEAN ACHESON, PRESENT AT THE CREATION, at xvii (1970).
ADOLF HITLER, MEIN KAMPF 295 (Reynal & Hitchcock trans., Houghton
Mifflin Co. 1939) (1925).
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despised. One’s safety lies in one’s own strength and this strength
consists primarily in the power to dominate.122

In Erich Fromm’s analysis, this “struggle for existence” was
moderated and channeled into a stable social order by the “natural”
bonds and roles of medieval society—family, trade, guild, religion,
community.123 At the same time, “psychological factors play [an]
active [role] in the social process[.]”124 The traditional “identity with
nature, clan, religion, gives the individual security. He belongs to . . . a
structuralized whole in which he has an unquestionable place.”125 (In
this traditional social ordering, a mere real estate developer—lacking
any experience in government, politics, academia, or the military—
could hardly aspire to become President.) But all this changed with the
transition from the “golden age” of Gemeinschaft (community) to the
not-so-golden age of Gesellschaft (society).126
The medieval social system was destroyed and with it the stability
and relative security it had offered the individual. Now with the
beginning of capitalism all classes of society started to move.
There ceased to be a fixed place in the economic order which could
be considered a natural, an unquestionable one. The individual was
left alone; everything depended on his own effort, not on the
security of his traditional status.127

In the new economic order:
122

123

124
125
126

127

A. H. Maslow, The Authoritarian Character Structure, 18 J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 401,
402–03 (1943). “If one is not strong enough the only alternative is to find a
strong protector. If this protector is strong enough and can be relied upon, then
peace of a certain sort is possible to the individual.” Id. at 403. A recent
commentator has reached similar conclusions about the world-view of President
Donald Trump: “Magnanimity, fair dealing, example setting, win-win solutions,
a city set upon a hill: All this, in the president’s mind, is a sucker’s game,
obscuring the dog-eat-dog realities of life. Among other distinctions, Mr. Trump
may be our first Hobbesian president.” Bret Stephens, Opinion, The Thomas
Hobbes Presidency: Conservatives Were Outraged by Obama’s Apologies.
What About Trump’s Slander?, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 7, 2017, 6:14 PM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-thomas-hobbes-presidency-1486426412
[https://perma.cc/2KRQ-F6VM].
See ERICH H. FROMM, ESCAPE FROM FREEDOM 5–6 (First Owl Book ed. 1994)
(1941).
Id. at 5.
Id. at 34.
See generally FERDINAND TÖNNIES, GEMEINSCHAFT UND GESELLSCHAFT
(1887).
FROMM, supra note 123, at 59.
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[T]he unpredictable laws of the market decided whether [one’s]
products could be sold at all and at what profit . . . .
. . . Each individual must go ahead and try his luck. He had to
swim or to sink. Others were not allied with him in a common
enterprise, they became competitors, and often he was confronted
with the choice of destroying them or being destroyed.128

Yet this new economic individuation also offered freedom from the
static, unchanging bonds, roles, and limits of traditional society. Now
an undistinguished real estate developer—a very, very wealthy real
estate developer—could indeed aspire to become President. The sky
was the limit, but it is lonely at the top. “They were more free, but they
were also more alone.”129 Security and community were traded for the
fruits of ambition and the chance for fame. And the masses?
The masses who did not share the wealth and power of the ruling
group had lost the security of their former status and had become a
shapeless mass, to be flattered or to be threatened—but always to
be manipulated and exploited by those in power. A new despotism
arose side by side with the new individualism.130

In this setting the appeal of authoritarianism makes perfect sense.
The dominating leader promises a way to overcome the unbearable
feeling of powerlessness: by “becom[ing] a part of a bigger and more
powerful whole outside of oneself, to submerge and participate in
it . . . . By becoming part of a power which is felt as unshakably
strong, eternal, and glamorous, one participates in its strength and
glory.”131 This same dynamic (or dialectic) applies to the leader as
well: “the ‘authoritarian character[]’ . . . admires authority and tends
to submit to it, but at the same time he wants to be an authority himself
and have others submit to him.”132 As Abraham Maslow puts it, in
psychological terms:
128

129
130
131
132

Id. at 60–61; see also id. at 99 (“The breakdown of the medieval system of
feudal society had one main significance for all classes of society: the individual
was left alone and isolated. He was free. This freedom had a twofold result. Man
was deprived of the security he had enjoyed, of the unquestionable feeling of
belonging, and he was torn loose from the world which had satisfied his quest
for security both economically and spiritually. He felt alone and anxious. But he
was also free to act and to think independently, to become his own master and
do with his life as he could—not as he was told to do.”).
Id. at 47.
Id. at 46.
Id. at 154.
Id. at 162.
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Every authoritarian character is both sadistic and masochistic.
Which tendency will appear depends largely (but not entirely) on
the situation. If he is in dominance status, he will tend to be cruel;
if he is in subordinate status, he will tend to be masochistic. But
because of these tendencies in himself, he will understand, and
deep down within himself will agree with the cruelty of the
superior person, even if he himself is the object of the cruelty.133

This analysis has clear implications for the clear and present dangers
of our time.
“America’s child president,” writes a conservative commentator
(George Will in the Washington Post):
[H]as a weak man’s banal fascination with strong men whose
disdain for him is evidently unimaginable to him. And, yes, he
only perfunctorily pretends to have priorities beyond personal
aggrandizement. But just as astronomers inferred, from anomalies
in the orbits of the planet Uranus, the existence of Neptune before
actually seeing it, [Special Counsel] Mueller might infer, and then
find, still-hidden sources of the behavior of this sad, embarrassing
wreck of a man.134

Or, from the liberal side (Bruce Shapiro in The Nation):
The political brutality of the Trump era is rooted in the Rehnquist
right’s decades-long campaign to undo the modern American
social contract—New Deal business regulations, civil rights,
environmental protections, and sexual equality—and to restore
executive power to the days before civil-liberties-minded judges
and a post-Watergate Congress reined it in.135

Or, finally, from what might be termed the British expatriate
perspective (Andrew Sullivan in New York Magazine):
This is not treason as such. It is not an attack on America, but
on a version of America, the liberal democratic one . . . . It is an
attack on those institutions that Trump believes hurt America—like
NATO and NAFTA and the E.U. It is a championing of an illiberal
America, and a partnering with autocrats in a replay of old-school
Great Power zero-sum politics, in which the strong pummel and
133

134

135

Maslow, supra note 122, at 408 (“He will understand the bootlicker and the
slave even if he himself is not the bootlicker or the slave.”).
George F. Will, Opinion, This Sad, Embarrassing Wreck of a Man, WASH. POST
(July 17, 2018, 2:57 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/this-sadembarrassing-wreck-of-a-man/2018/07/17/d06de8ea-89e8-11e8-a345a1bf7847b375_story.html [https://perma.cc/BQT3-F54P].
Bruce Shapiro, Keeping Kavanaugh Off the Supreme Court, NATION (July 18,
2018), https://www.thenation.com/article/keeping-kavanaugh-off-supremecourt/
[https://perma.cc/98UB-S5BJ].
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exploit the weak. Trump is simultaneously vandalizing the West,
while slowly building a strongman alliance that rejects every single
Western value. And Russia—authoritarian, ethnically homogeneous, internally brutal, internationally rogue—is at its center.136

In 1965, Erich Fromm wrote that “[t]he United States has shown
itself resistant against all totalitarian attempts to gain influence.”137
Would he write the same thing today?138
B. The Narcissist-in-Chief
As adults, we have forgotten most of our childhood, not only its
contents but its flavor; as men of the world, we hardly know of the
existence of the inner world . . . . Our capacity to think, except in
the service of what we are dangerously deluded in supposing is our
self-interest and in conformity with common sense, is pitifully
limited: our capacity even to see, hear, touch, taste and smell is so
shrouded in veils of mystification that an intensive discipline of
unlearning is necessary for anyone . . . .139

Under the U.S. Constitution, no one can become President who has
not “attained to the Age of thirty five Years.”140 Does this ensure that
American Presidents will be mature enough—mentally, intellectually,
morally, emotionally—for the job? This question began receiving the
attention it deserved at about the same time as Donald Trump started
ascending the presidential opinion polls.
“Honestly, I don’t think people change that much,” says Mr.
Trump himself.141 “When I look at myself in the first grade and I look

136

137
138

139
140
141

Andrew Sullivan, Why Trump Has Such a Soft Spot for Russia, N.Y. MAG.: THE
INTELLIGENCER (July 20, 2018), http://nymag.com/intelligencer/2018/07/
andrew-sullivan-why-trump-has-such-a-soft-spot-for-russia.html
[https://perma.cc/Z96Q-LUZN].
FROMM, supra note 123, at xv.
See generally, e.g., MADELEINE ALBRIGHT, FASCISM: A WARNING 4 (2018)
(“Why . . . is democracy now ‘under assault and in retreat?’ Why are many
people in positions of power seeking to undermine public confidence in
elections, the courts, the media, and—on the fundamental question of earth’s
future—science ? . . . And why, this far into the twenty-first century, are we
once again talking about Fascism?”).
R. D. LAING, THE POLITICS OF EXPERIENCE 10–11 (1967).
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 5.
Maureen Dowd, Opinion, Introducing Donald Trump, Diplomat, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 16, 2015, at SR9.
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at myself now, I’m basically the same.”142 Distinguished anthropologist James Harvey Robinson states for the record:
[A]ccumulating evidence seems to indicate that when bodily
maturity is once reached, the increase of knowledge and
intelligence slackens or even almost ceases in many cases. By 13
or 14 the child has acquired an overwhelming part of the
knowledge, impressions, cautions and general estimates of his
fellow creatures and the world in which he lives, which he
continues to harbour with slight modifications during his
lifetime . . . .
. . . We have had time before 13 to take over the standardized
sentiments of our elders, to learn all that they know, to accept their
views of religion, politics, manners, general proprieties and
respectabilities.143

This developmental paradigm has recently received highly instructive,
first-hand confirmation from General James N. Mattis, who served as
President Trump’s Secretary of Defense:
It seemed Mattis and others were at the end of their rope with
the president. How are you possibly questioning these things that
are obvious and so fundamental? It was as if Mattis were saying,
God, stop it!
....
The president left. Among the principals there was exasperation
with these questions. Why are we having to do this constantly?
When is he going to learn? They couldn’t believe they were having
these conversations and had to justify their reasoning. Mattis was
particularly exasperated and alarmed, telling close associates that
the president acted like—and had the understanding of—“a fifth or
sixth grader.”144

That would put Mr. Trump at the intellectual level of a ten to twelveyear-old—a bit at the low end of Robinson’s developmental model,
142

143

144

MICHAEL D’ANTONIO, NEVER ENOUGH 40 (2015) (emphasis added). Translated
into age-brackets, Trump is essentially saying: “I’m basically the same now as I
was at age six.”
James Harvey Robinson, Civilization, in 5 Encyclopædia Britannica 735, 739
(14th ed. 1929). Professor Robinson based these conclusions partly on millions
of intelligence tests administered by the military.
BOB WOODWARD, FEAR: TRUMP IN THE WHITE HOUSE 306, 307–08 (2018); cf.
Jack Healy et al., ‘Our Country Is Being Run by Children’: Shutdown’s End
Brings Relief and Frustration, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 25, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/25/us/shutdown-federal-workersreaction.html [https://perma.cc/49J4-VAT7].
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but otherwise generally consistent with it. Thus, when Senator Rand
Paul points to “a sophomoric quality that is entertaining about Mr.
Trump,” and asks: “My goodness, that happened in junior high. Are
we not way above that?”145—the answer must be, “No, we are not.”
How could we be?
According to a standard manual of mental disorders, a clinically
significant personality disorder can generally be traced back to
adolescence or at least early adulthood. It forms “an enduring pattern
of thinking, feeling, and behaving that is relatively stable over
time”146—which fits in well with Trump’s claims that “I’m a solid,
stable person” and that, anyway, “people [don’t] change that much.”147
The extreme manifestation of this phenomenon would be Peter Pan,
the boy who never grew up at all:
The difference between him and the other boys . . . was that
they knew it was make-believe, while to him make-believe and
true were exactly the same thing. This sometimes troubled them, as
when they had to make-believe that they had had their dinners.
....
. . . Peter would not budge. He was tingling with life and also
top-heavy with conceit. “Am I not a wonder, oh, I am a wonder!”
he whispered . . . .
....
Peter was not quite like other boys; but he was afraid at last. A
tremor ran through him, like a shudder passing over the sea; but on
the sea one shudder follows another till there are hundreds of them,
and Peter felt just the one. Next moment he was standing erect on
the rock again, with that smile on his face and a drum beating
within him. It was saying, “To die will be an awfully big
adventure.”148

Peter Pan appears to be suffering from a number of serious mental
disorders. Even so, “overweening ambition and confidence may lead

145

146

147
148

Frank Bruni, Opinion, An Overdose of Donald Trump at the G.O.P. Debate,
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 16, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/17/opinion/anoverdose-of-donald-trump-republican-gop-debate.html [https://perma.cc/87GMNEH4].
AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL
DISORDERS 647 (5th ed. 2013) [hereinafter DSM-5].
Dowd, supra note 141.
J. M. BARRIE, PETER PAN 61, 77, 84 (Jack Zipes ed., Penguin Books 2004)
(1911).
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to high achievement,”149 as the diagnostic guidelines concede and as
the example of Donald Trump confirms. (Such people tend to have
biographies written about them with titles like Never Enough;
according to George Will, they also tend to “nurs[e] . . . innumerable
delusions.”)150 Several standard psychology textbooks feature Trump
as an example, one of which states:
Mr. Trump’s image is exemplary of the culture of narcissism: he
refers to himself in the third person as “The Donald” and is
primarily well known as the developer whose name must appear on
each edifice and on his array of highly publicized marriages,
divorces, and prenuptial agreements. He is the sole purveyor of
winning and losing.151

Within the mental health disciplines, narcissism is understood as a
normal and healthy stage of childhood development and psychological
growth. “In healthy development,” writes one analyst, “the child’s
normal initial sense of grandiosity (‘when I cry, milk is produced’) is
gradually modified and transformed into energy, ambition, and selfesteem.”152 By contrast, however, arrested development of these
attributes may lead to narcissistic personality disorder.153 An adult
with this disorder:

149

150

151

152

153

DSM-5, supra note 146, at 671 (discussing “associated features supporting
diagnosis” of narcissistic personality disorder).
George F. Will, Opinion, Donald Trump is a Counterfeit Republican, WASH.
POST (Aug. 12, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/a-counterfeitrepublican/2015/08/12/c28c2968-4052-11e5-bfe3-ff1d8549bfd2_story.html
[https://perma.cc/K33T-KZEM] (“In every town large enough to have two
traffic lights there is a bar at the back of which sits the local Donald Trump,
nursing his fifth beer and innumerable delusions.”); see D’ANTONIO, supra note
142.
Jerrold Lee Shapiro & Susan Bernadett-Shapiro, Narcissism: Greek Tragedy,
Psychological Syndrome, Cultural Norm, in 1 MENTAL DISORDERS OF THE NEW
MILLENNIUM 25, 38 (Thomas G. Plante ed., 2006).
Id. at 31. “[A]ll theorists who address this syndrome agree that narcissism is a
healthy and appropriate stage of childhood development.” Id. at 30.
See Joan Acocella, Selfie: How Big a Problem Is Narcissism?, NEW YORKER,
May 12, 2014 (book review).
In the DSM, narcissism is one of the so-called “personality
disorders,” a category different from neuroses . . . . Neuroses are
afflictions of the “worried well.” At a certain point in these
people’s lives, things become hard for them. They wake up in the
middle of the night; they’re swamped with dread; they don’t know
why. A personality disorder, by contrast, doesn’t seem to start or to
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1. Has a grandiose sense of self-importance (e.g., exaggerates
achievements and talents, expects to be recognized as superior
without commensurate achievements).
....
4. Requires excessive admiration.
....
9. Shows arrogant, haughty behaviors or attitudes.
....
Vulnerability in self-esteem makes individuals with narcissistic
personality disorder very sensitive to “injury” from criticism or
defeat . . . . They may react with disdain, rage, or defiant
counterattack.154

go away. The person’s family will often report that he’s always
been like that. Furthermore, he thinks that he is perfectly all right.
154

Id.
DSM-5, supra note 146, at 669–71. Additionally, “[i]ndividuals with this
disorder . . . may be preoccupied with how well they are doing and how
favorably they are regarded by others.” Id. at 670. See George T. Conway III,
Unfit for Office: Donald Trump’s Narcissism Makes It Impossible for Him to
Carry Out the Duties of the Presidency in the Way the Constitution Requires,
ATLANTIC (Oct. 3, 2019), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2019/10/
george-conway-trump-unfit-office/599128/ [https://perma.cc/8ZT8-8S3H]; see
also Mark Leibovich, Donald Trump is Not Going Anywhere, N.Y. TIMES MAG.,
Oct. 4, 2015, at 28 32–33. “I observed to Trump that I had never encountered a
candidate who talked so much to me about the latest polls. He knew precisely
why that was. ‘That’s because they’re not leading,’ he said.” Id. at 52. The
article continues:
Trump makes no attempt to cloak his love of fame and,
admirably, will not traffic in that tiresome politicians’ notion that
his campaign is “not about me, it’s about you.” The ease with
which Trump exhibits, and inhabits, his self-regard is not only
central to his “brand” but also highlights a kind of honesty about
him . . . .
....
. . . I, too, have grown exceedingly weary of this world—the
familiar faces, recycled tropes and politics as usual—and here was
none other than Donald J. Trump, the billionaire blowhard whom I
had resisted as a cartoonish demagogue, defiling it with
resonance . . . .
....

248

UMass Law Review

v. 15 | 197

(“I hope they attack me,” says Trump, “because everybody who
attacks me is doomed.”155)
When his beloved Wendy falls into a frightful faint, Peter Pan
springs boldly into action. Instead of moving her (which “would not be
sufficiently respectful”) he decrees that a whole new house should be
built right around her—on the spot.156 None of the other boys objects;
indeed, “[t]hey were all delighted” with such a grand idea, and soon
“they were as busy as tailors the night before a wedding.”157
Afterwards, Peter Pan inspects the finished house and notes only that it
lacks a chimney and a knocker on the door, both of which are quickly
supplied.158
Likewise, none of Donald Trump’s stated policy prescriptions
seems at all beyond the appreciation of an average teenager. Indeed,
they verge on the blindingly obvious.159 Illegal immigrants? “Build a
wall. A Great Wall. A very long and costly wall. And make those dirty
banditos pay for it! (Somehow.)”160
. . . Was Trump the logical byproduct of a cancerous system in
which American democracy has mutated into a gold rush of cheap
celebrity, wealth creation and narcissistic branding madness? Or
has he merely wielded the tools of this transformation—his money,
celebrity and dominance of the media—against the forces that have
engendered this disgust in the system to begin with?
155

156
157

158
159

160

Id. 32–33.
Monica Langley, Donald Trump’s One-Man Roadshow: GOP Hopeful Soars
Amid Rivals’ Hostility; ‘Everybody Who Attacks Me Is Doomed,’ WALL ST. J.,
Sept. 14, 2015, at A1.
BARRIE, supra note 148, at 60.
Id.; cf. id. at 88 (“Peter thought it his due, and he would answer condescendingly, ‘It is good. Peter Pan has spoken.’”).
Id. at 63.
Cf. WILHELM REICH, THE MASS PSYCHOLOGY OF FASCISM 83 (Vincent R.
Carfagno trans., 3d ed. 1970) (“Hitler repeatedly stressed that one could not get
at the masses with arguments, proofs, and knowledge, but only with feelings and
beliefs. In the language of National Socialism . . . the nebulous and the mystical
are . . . conspicuous . . . .”).
See Immigration Reform That Will Make America Great Again, TRUMP: MAKE
AM.
GREAT
AGAIN!,
https://meitar.github.io/radical-leftists-for-trump/
www.donaldjtrump.com/positions/immigration-reform [https://perma.cc/TW6RK9PA]. The website proclaims:
1.

A nation without borders is not a nation. There must be a wall
across the southern border.
....
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Mr. Trump offers—as one commentator puts it—“a simpler and
more appealing narrative than the realities of the current global
economy.”161 It is probably no accident that his campaign slogan
(“Make America Great Again!”) is not something like “America—
Whistling Past the Graveyard?” or even “America, Just Do It.” (Mr.
Trump, ever the enterprising businessman, has actually trademarked
“Make America Great Again!” and warned other candidates against
using the phrase for “promoting public awareness of political issues”
or “fundraising in the field of politics.”162 So, be careful what you say
about America. Be very careful.)
Of course, a teenage politician’s target audience would be his
fellow teenagers. And none of their commonly stated “reasons” for
supporting Mr. Trump seems beyond the intellectual range of a
teenager either. (“When he gets in there,” said one, “he’ll figure it
out.”163 Somehow.)
For many years, Mexico’s leaders have been taking advantage
of the United States by using illegal immigration to export the
crime and poverty in their own country (as well as in other Latin
American countries).
....
. . . They are responsible for this problem, and they must help
pay to clean it up.
....
Mexico must pay for the wall . . . . We will not be taken
advantage of anymore.
161

162

163

Id.
Brendan Nyhan, Donald Trump, the Green Lantern Candidate, UPSHOT (New
York Times) (Aug. 25, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/26/upshot/
donald-trump-the-green-lantern-candidate.html?searchResultPosition=1
[https://perma.cc/84EP-CJQJ].
See MAKE AMERICA GREAT AGAIN, Registration No. 4,773,272. In
connection with the filing of the trademark, Mr. Trump’s attorney explained
that, “[t]he issue is not whether it is being used verbally by others in public. The
problem is that it is repeatedly being used by others as a slogan or catchphrase.
That is what the trademark filing protects against.” David Martosko, Trump
Trademarked Slogan ‘Make America Great Again,’ DAILYMAIL.COM (May 12,
2015, 12:04 PM), https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3077773/Trumptrademarked-slogan-Make-America-Great-just-DAYS-2012-election-says-TedCruz-agreed-not-use-Scott-Walker-booms-TWICE-speech.html
[https://perma.cc/R2RF-LG6A] (last updated May 13, 2015, 12:28 AM).
Alan Blinder, Trump Fails to Fill Alabama Stadium, but Fans’ Zeal Is Hardly
Diminished, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 22, 2015, at A11. Although Mr. Trump has
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“I play to people’s fantasies,” Mr. Trump once wrote in explaining
his alleged business acumen. “I call it truthful hyperbole.”164 This
approach seems to resonate particularly well with youthful audiences:
Mr. Trump offered a speech of less than a minute on the state
party’s stage. But that was beside the point, as star-struck
supporters greeted him like a stadium rocker during a sprawling
tailgate party before kickoff.
....
. . . [Y]oung people . . . predominated outside Jack Trice
Stadium, where the Iowa State Cyclones hosted the Iowa
Hawkeyes.
....
Though he said nothing about the issues of the day, the
audience seemed satisfied. “It was pretty cool; we got to see him,”
said Braiden Loreno, a sophomore. “I’m definitely voting for
him.”165

It is probably inadvisable to take Mr. Trump’s stated “policy
views” too terribly seriously. Indeed one commentator has written an
article entitled The Serious Problem with Treating Donald Trump
Seriously.166
That we’re even talking about his “positions” means that we’ve
already progressed to the dangerous Stage Two of the Trump
phenomenon, as if his stated views are the standard by which
Trump ought to be judged . . . . But looking for some kind of
ideological thread in Trump’s various positions is a fool’s errand
(and another victory for Trump). The appeal of Trump’s alleged

164

165

166

drawn criticism for unveiling few detailed policy proposals, many of his
supporters said they were unbothered. “When he gets in there, he’ll figure it
out,” said Amanda Mancini, who said she had traveled from California to see
Mr. Trump. “So we do have to trust him, but he has something that we can trust
in. We can look at the Trump brand . . . .” Id.
DONALD J. TRUMP WITH TONY SCHWARTZ, TRUMP: THE ART OF THE DEAL 40
(1987).
Trip Gabriel, Trump Gets Rock Star Greeting in Iowa (Oh, and Three Rivals
Also Show Up), N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 2015, at A22.
Michael Kinsley, The Serious Problem with Treating Donald Trump Seriously,
VANITY FAIR (Oct. 12, 2015), http://www.vanityfair.com/news/2015/10/theserious-problem-with-treating-donald-trump-seriously [https://perma.cc/69HLTVXX].
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views on every issue is their extremeness. That, and their seeming
simplicity.167

The football tailgater is Mr. Trump’s true métier and the standard by
which he should be judged.168 “Though he said nothing about the
issues of the day, the audience seemed satisfied.”169 (What more do
you need to know?)
In a highly unusual development, a “a senior official in the Trump
Administration” has publicly raised concerns to a national audience in
an anonymous New York Times Op-Ed, questioning inter alia
President Trump’s intellectual and emotional maturity and his fitness
for office.
[W]e believe our first duty is to this country, and the president
continues to act in a manner that is detrimental to the health of our
republic.

167

168

Id. (“Trump stands for the proposition that you don’t need to know much to run
the government. You just need to use your common sense . . . .”).
Cf. HANNAH ARENDT, THE ORIGINS OF TOTALITARIANISM 305 (1966).
(“Hitler . . . during his lifetime exercised a fascination to which allegedly no one
was immune . . . .”). Arendt described the effect Hitler had on his listeners:
The “magic spell” that Hitler cast over his listeners . . . rested
indeed “on the fanatical belief of this man in himself,” on his
pseudo-authoritative judgments about everything under the sun,
and on the fact that his opinions . . . could always be fitted into an
all-encompassing ideology.
. . . Society is always prone to accept a person offhand for what
he pretends to be, so that a crackpot posing as a genius always has
a certain chance to be believed. In modern society, with its
characteristic lack of discerning judgment, this tendency is
strengthened, so that someone who not only holds opinions but
also presents them in a tone of unshakable conviction will not so
easily forfeit his prestige, no matter how many times he has been
demonstrably wrong. Hitler, who knew the modern chaos of
opinions from first-hand experience, discovered that the helpless
seesawing between various opinions and “the conviction . . . that
everything is balderdash” could best be avoided by adhering to one
of the many current opinions with “unbending consistency.” The
hair-raising arbitrariness of such fanaticism holds great fascination
for society because for the duration of the social gathering it is
freed from the chaos of opinions that it constantly generates.

169

Id. at 305 n.1.
Gabriel, supra note 165.
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That is why many Trump appointees have vowed to do what we
can to preserve our democratic institutions while thwarting Mr.
Trump’s more misguided impulses until he is out of office.
The root of the problem is the president’s amorality. Anyone
who works with him knows he is not moored to any discernible
first principles that guide his decision making . . . .
....
In addition to his mass-marketing of the notion that the press is
the “enemy of the people,” President Trump’s impulses are
generally anti-trade and anti-democratic.
....
It may be cold comfort in this chaotic era, but Americans
should know that there are adults in the room. We fully recognize
what is happening. And we are trying to do what’s right even when
Donald Trump won’t.
....
Given the instability many witnessed, there were early whispers
within the cabinet of invoking the 25th Amendment, which would
start a complex process for removing the president. But no one
wanted to precipitate a constitutional crisis. So we will do what we
can to steer the administration in the right direction until—one way
or another—it’s over.170
170

Opinion, The Quiet Resistance Inside the Trump Administration, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 6, 2018, at A23 (emphasis added); see also Dwight Garner, A Road Map of
‘Crazytown,’ N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 6, 2018, at C1 (book review) (“The reality was
that the United States in 2017 was tethered to the words and actions of an
emotionally overwrought, mercurial and unpredictable leader. Members of his
staff had joined to purposefully block some of what they believed were the
president’s most dangerous impulses. It was a nervous breakdown of the
executive power of the most powerful country in the world.” (quoting BOB
WOODWARD, FEAR: TRUMP IN THE WHITE HOUSE, at xxii (2018)). I have not
even discussed President Trump’s mounting “legal” troubles (in the narrow
sense). The following will have to suffice:
Eventually, the whole Robert Mueller investigation will reach
its conclusion and the story will be restored to clear view. But even
now we know what Trump seems unable to comprehend—that he
is a key reason why the investigation keeps going. This is not
because he is reviled by the establishment for his politics, but
because of what the investigation and his response have already
revealed about this character: his disregard of legal limits when it
is in his personal and political interest to ignore them, and his
persistent failure to render an honest accounting of his actions . . . .
....
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The President’s response? “‘The New York Times is failing,’ Trump
said in the East Room. ‘If I weren’t here, I believe The New York
Times probably wouldn’t even exist.’”171
III. COUNSEL FOR THE SITUATION
A. Defending Liberal Democracy
In a liberal democracy, the most significant bulwarks against
authoritarian tyranny may be classified as follows: Input Controls,
Process Controls, and Output Controls.172
Input Controls determine, directly or indirectly, who shall have a
seat at the table—a vote in the polity. It is possible to imagine
extraordinary scenarios in which the principle of universal political
participation might justifiably be suspended. Perhaps the following
will sound faintly familiar:
Imagine a totalitarian clique taking advantage of an economic
crisis to exploit popular discontent. The propaganda machine
spreads the word: If only Adolf or Benito or Vladimir were in
command, they would have the wisdom to make the sun rise once
more in the heavens. This messianic message gains a powerful
political following, both on the streets and in the ballot box. What
then?173

Of course, as Ackerman acknowledges, “crudities like barring
totalitarian groups from parliament must be recognized as the acts of
Trump’s chronic scorn for the law and legal institutions,
together with his trademark dishonesty, are not the only ways in
which the president has presented the prosecutors with a damaging
picture of himself and his motives. Those attributes appear in the
specifics of his conduct as both president and, before then, as
candidate, and it is reflected in the conduct of many of those whom
he has chosen to assist him in his affairs.

171

172
173

Bob Bauer, Trump’s Contempt for the Law Will Be His Downfall, ATLANTIC
(Aug. 26, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2018/08/trumpscontempt-for-the-law-will-be-his-downfall/568564/
[https://perma.cc/LP9VA9AM].
Andrew Restuccia et al., ‘It’s Open Season on the President’: Op-Ed Unleashes
West Wing Meltdown, POLITICO (Sept. 5, 2018, 4:36 PM),
https://www.politico.com/story/2018/09/05/trump-official-comes-out-againstthe-president-in-anonymous-times-op-ed-808714 [https://perma.cc/5EA7-9EA9]
(last updated Sept. 5, 2018, 10:30 PM).
ACKERMAN, supra note 8, at 302–13.
Id. at 304.
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desperation they are.”174 (On the other hand, as has also been well
observed, the United States Constitution is not a “suicide pact.”)175
Among the more indirect approaches: “[I]t is possible to imagine
structural measures that will affect the long-term liberality of the social
forces that push their way into the governmental arena. The question
here is political education in its broadest sense.”176
Process Controls address features of institutional design—the way
formal institutions structure participation in the affairs of state. In the
American setting, the notion of Process Controls is largely a nod to the
legacy of The Federalist No. 10 (Madison) and its familiar analyses of
federalism, separation of powers, and checks and balances as
constitutional safeguards against the tyranny of “faction.” In the
present circumstances, however, Ackerman’s description of Process
Controls sounds hopelessly naive:
The goal is to remove law-making authority from the hands of a
single statesman or easily organized clique. No official’s word
becomes law when it is spoken; each power holder is
constitutionally obliged to persuade others whose tenure does not
depend on their passive acquiescence. This idea is taken to its
extreme in the American system, where President, Supreme Court,
and the two Houses of Congress are deprived of the power of
unilateral command in the hope of forcing each to engage the
others in a convincing effort at conversation.177

These Process Controls are supposed to “make it costly for statesmen
to indulge authoritarian pretensions.”178 (But what if the statesmen are
billionaires?)
Output Controls attempt to place some political and legal outcomes
permanently beyond the reach of government, as with the “absolute”
prohibitions of a Bill of Rights. Counter-majoritarian judicial review
and the jurisprudence of fundamental rights are thereby tasked with
protecting certain outcomes against “the tyranny of the majority.”179
The following discussion draws on versions of both Input Controls
and Output Controls.
174
175

176
177
178
179

Id. at 305.
See Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 37 (1949) (Jackson, J.,
dissenting).
ACKERMAN, supra note 8, at 305 (emphasis added).
Id. at 306.
Id. at 303 (emphasis added).
See, e.g., JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY (1859), reprinted in J. S. MILL ON
LIBERTY IN FOCUS 21, 23–30 (John Gray & G.W. Smith eds., 1991).
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B. A Proposed Constitutional Amendment
For purposes of discussion, it may be useful to set out a proposed
constitutional amendment designed to address some of the above
issues. The intention of the amendment is to cultivate a more
thoughtful, informed, judicious, and “politically educated” electorate.
Section 1.
Education is a fundamental right of all people in the United States.
This right may neither be denied without Due Process of law nor
abridged in any manner inconsistent with the Equal Protection of
the laws. No State may deny or abridge access to education, at any
level, based on inability to pay.
Section 2.
No person born or naturalized in the United States shall be eligible
to vote, without first having earned a high school diploma or the
equivalent (as granted by a duly accredited school district). This
provision applies only to persons who shall not have attained to the
age of fifty years by the time this article is ratified; upon
ratification, this provision shall go into effect after three years have
passed.
No person born or naturalized in the United States after ratification
of this article, or within fifteen years prior to its ratification, shall
be eligible to vote, without first having earned a college degree (as
granted by a duly accredited institution of higher education).
Enrollment in good standing at such an institution satisfies this
requirement.
Section 3.
Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate
legislation.

In many ways, this proposed amendment may be viewed as a radical
measure. I view it as a proportionate response to a governmental crisis
of epic proportions.
In what follows, the historical and legal bases of this proposed
amendment are set out in summary fashion. Then some of the broader
implications of education and voting as safeguards of liberal
democracy are explored.
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C. The Long Arc of Footnote Four
The U.S. Constitution makes explicit and implicit references to the
virtues and value of education. In Article I, the Congress is
empowered to “promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts” by
protecting authors and inventors with copyright and patent laws.180
The First Amendment protects “the freedom of speech, [and] of the
press” against any “abridg[ment]” by Congress or the States.181 This
language has been judicially interpreted to include an implied right of
“freedom of association”182 as well as an implied “right to receive
information.”183 Together, these express and implied provisions
underwrite a grand intellectual and educational project known as “the
marketplace of ideas,” which was given its seminal expression in a
1919 dissenting opinion of Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes:
Persecution for the expression of opinions seems to me perfectly
logical. If you have no doubt of your premises or your power and
want a certain result with all your heart you naturally express your
wishes in law and sweep away all opposition . . . . But when men
have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths, they may
come to believe even more than they believe the very foundations
of their own conduct that the ultimate good desired is better
reached by free trade in ideas—that the best test of truth is the
power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the
market, and that truth is the only ground upon which their wishes
safely can be carried out. That at any rate is the theory of our
Constitution.184

What would it mean for education to be a “fundamental,”
constitutional right? “Typically,” writes John Hart Ely, “what we mean
by labeling something a constitutional right is that the state cannot
deny it to everyone and that when it denies it to some but not others it
had better have a very good reason for doing so.”185 Here, some
background may be useful.
In Skinner v. Oklahoma, an Oklahoma law labeled as “habitual
criminals” those who committed two or more felonies involving
180
181

182
183
184
185

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
U.S. CONST. amend. I; see also Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925)
(The First Amendment is enforceable against the States by virtue of its
“incorporation” in the Fourteenth Amendment.).
See NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 460–61 (1958).
See Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969).
Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 234 n.30 (1980).
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“moral turpitude.”186 Habitual criminals were subject to being
“rendered sexually sterile.”187
Skinner’s first felony was chicken stealing, obviously a crime of
high “moral turpitude.” But the Oklahoma law made some
conspicuous exceptions: “[O]ffenses arising out of the violation of the
prohibitory laws, revenue acts, embezzlement, or political offenses,
shall not come or be considered within the terms of this Act.”188 Thus,
one could embezzle as much as one liked, and receive the same
sentence as for comparable larceny—without ever being subject to
sterilization.
This the Supreme Court could not abide:
[T]he nature of the two crimes is intrinsically the same and they
are punishable in the same manner. Furthermore, the line between
them follows . . . highly technical [distinctions] . . . .
....
. . . [T]he instant legislation runs afoul of the equal protection
clause, though we give Oklahoma that large deference which the
rule of the [previous] cases requires.189

The Court here refers to the rule, authoritatively expounded by James
Bradley Thayer, that judicial review should generally defer to
legislative choices (the so-called “presumption of constitutionality”).
The legislature is the lawmaker in the first instance, and only if
someone happens to challenge a law will it ever be judicially
reviewed. (Both courts and legislatures know this.) In striking down
legislation on grounds of unconstitutionality, the courts are in effect
“intruding” on the work of a coordinate branch of government—the
branch primarily entrusted with legislation.190 Thus, to overturn an
186
187
188
189
190

Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 536 (1942).
Id. at 536–37.
Id. at 537.
Id. at 539–41.
See James B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of
Constitutional Law, 7 HARV. L. REV. 129, 135–37 (1893) for a discussion of this
issue:
Not merely, then, do these questions, when presenting themselves
in the courts for judicial action, call for a peculiarly large method
in the treatment of them, but especially they require an allowance
to be made by the judges for the vast and not definable range of
legislative power and choice, for that wide margin of
considerations which address themselves only to the practical
judgment of a legislative body . . . . In so far as legislative choice,
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allegedly mistaken law, the mistake must be so obvious that “those
who have the right to make laws have not merely made a mistake, but
have made a very clear one,—so clear that it is not open to rational
question.”191
If the Oklahoma law involved only the legislative categorization of
crimes, no substantial constitutional question would be presented.
(“States may do a good deal of classifying that it is difficult to believe
rational.”)192 In Skinner though, as the Court emphasized:
We are dealing . . . with legislation which involves one of the basic
civil rights of man. Marriage and procreation are fundamental to
the very existence and survival of the race. The power to sterilize,
if exercised, may have subtle, far-reaching and devastating effects.
In evil or reckless hands it can cause races or types which are
inimical to the dominant group to wither and disappear . . . .
ranging here unfettered, may select one form of action or another,
the judges must not interfere, since their question is a naked
judicial one.
. . . Now, it is the legislature to whom this power is given,—this
power, not merely of enacting laws, but of putting an interpretation
on the constitution which shall deeply affect the whole country,
enter into, vitally change, even revolutionize the most serious
affairs, except as some individual may find it for his private
interest to carry the matter into court . . . .
It is plain that where a power so momentous as this primary
authority to interpret is given, the actual determinations of the
body to whom it is intrusted are entitled to a corresponding
respect; and this not on mere grounds of courtesy or conventional
respect, but on very solid and significant grounds of policy and
law . . . . As the opportunity of the judges to check and correct
unconstitutional Acts is so limited, it may help us to understand
why the extent of their control, when they do have the opportunity,
should also be narrow.
191

Id. at 144. Thayer further notes:
This rule recognizes that, having regard to the great, complex,
ever-unfolding exigencies of government, much which will seem
unconstitutional to one man, or body of men, may reasonably not
seem so to another; that the constitution often admits of different
interpretations; that there is often a range of choice and judgment;
that in such cases the constitution does not impose upon the
legislature any one specific opinion, but leaves open this range of
choice; and that whatever choice is rational is constitutional.

192

Id.
Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536, 541 (1927).
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[Oklahoma] has made as invidious a discrimination as if it had
selected a particular race or nationality for oppressive treatment.193

A few years earlier, in United States v. Carolene Products Co.,
Justice Stone had unveiled a new theory of heightened judicial review,
several aspects of which seem to coalesce here:
There may be narrower scope for operation of the presumption
of constitutionality when legislation appears on its face to be
within a specific prohibition of the Constitution, such as those of
the first ten Amendments, which are deemed equally specific when
held to be embraced within the Fourteenth [Amendment] . . . .
It is unnecessary to consider now whether legislation which
restricts those political processes which can ordinarily be expected
to bring about repeal of undesirable legislation, is to be subjected
to more exacting judicial scrutiny under the general prohibitions of
the Fourteenth Amendment than are most other types of
legislation . . . .
Nor need we enquire whether similar considerations enter into
the review of statutes directed at particular religious, or national, or
racial minorities. [P]rejudice against discrete and insular minorities
may be a special condition, which tends seriously to curtail the
operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon
to protect minorities, and which may call for a correspondingly
more searching judicial inquiry.194

As an initial matter, the “right to marry and have offspring” is
arguably at the level of those explicitly protected liberties in the Bill of
Rights.195 (Stone himself, writing a concurring opinion in Skinner,
argues that the Oklahoma statute violates due process.)196 Second, in
creating a disfavored underclass of “blue-collar felons,” Oklahoma has
made “as invidious a discrimination as if it had selected a particular
race or nationality for oppressive treatment.”197 Nowadays, the right to
193
194

195
196

197

Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541.
United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (emphasis
added) (citations omitted); see also ELY, supra note 185, at 105 (discussing
judicial review as it relates to the First Amendment).
Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541.
See Skinner, 316 U.S. at 544–45 (Stone, C.J., concurring) (“There are limits to
the extent to which the presumption of constitutionality can be pressed,
especially where the liberty of the person is concerned . . . . A law which
condemns, without hearing, all the individuals of a class to so harsh a measure
as the present because some or even many merit condemnation, is lacking in the
first principles of due process.”).
Id. at 541 (majority opinion).
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procreation would be considered a “fundamental right” and benefit
from heightened judicial review on either of the above rationales.
A constitutional amendment explicitly deeming education a
fundamental right would, by definition, benefit from heightened
review under Stone’s first paragraph. (Legislation inconsistent with
such a right would then “appear[] on its face to be within a specific
prohibition of the Constitution.”)198 But any restriction on the right to
vote raises fundamental questions of its own, some of which are
touched on in Stone’s second paragraph (the conceptual framework of
“representation-reinforcing review”).199
One of the things we mean by labeling something a right is that it
shall not be denied, or granted in only watered-down form, to some
subset of persons unless there is a good reason for doing so.
....
. . . [I]t is therefore incumbent on the courts to ensure not only
that no one is denied the vote for no reason, but also that where
there is a reason (as there will be) it had better be a very
convincing one.200

D. A New Electorate
Justice Stone cites two voting rights cases (twice) in Carolene
Products footnote. Nixon v. Herndon involved a suit by a Black man
who was denied the right to vote pursuant to a Texas statute providing
that “in no event shall a negro be eligible to participate in a
Democratic party primary election held in the State of Texas.”201
Justice Holmes, writing for the Court, dismissed defendants’ main
argument—that the suit was “political”—as “little more than a play
upon words . . . . That private damage may be caused by . . . political
action and may be recovered for in a suit at law hardly has been
doubted for over two hundred years . . . .”202 (Holmes then proceeds to
cite a case from 1703, reported partly in Latin.)203
198
199
200
201

202
203

Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. at 152 n.4.
See ELY, supra note 185, at 87–88, 116–17.
Id. at 118 n.*, 120.
Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536, 540 (1927) (quoting Acts 38th Leg. 2d Called
Sess. (1923) c 32, § 1 (Vernon’s Ann. Civ. St. 1925, art. 3107)).
Id.
Ashby v. White (1703) 92 Eng. Rep. 126; 2 Ld. Raym. 938. In that case Chief
Justice Holt stated:
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The invalidity of the Texas statute was not open to doubt, “because
it seems to us hard to imagine a more direct and obvious infringement
of the Fourteenth [Amendment],” writes Holmes; “[s]tates may do a
good deal of classifying that it is difficult to believe rational, but there
are limits . . . .”204 Little more than a decade later, those limits would
have a new name (and a new theory): Stone’s “heightened judicial
review.”
The Herndon decision created “an emergency” in Texas—and the
chilling prospect that a Black man might vote in a Democratic Party
primary election.205 In response, the legislature of Texas hastily
enacted a new statute providing, inter alia: “[E]very political party in
this State through its State Executive Committee shall have the power
to prescribe the qualifications of its own members and shall in its own
It is not to be doubted, but that the commons of England have a
great and considerable right in the government, and a share in the
legislative, without whom no law passes; but because of their vast
numbers this right is not exerciseable by them in their proper
persons, and therefore by the constitution of England, it has been
directed, that it should be exercised by representatives, chosen by
and out of themselves, who have the whole right of all the
commons of England vested in them . . . .
Id. at 134; 2 Ld. Raym. at 950.
A right that a man has to give his vote at the election of a person to
represent him in Parliament, there to concur to the making of laws,
which are to bind his liberty and property, is a most transcendent
thing, and of an high nature, and the law takes notice of it as such
in divers statutes . . . .
Id. at 135–36; 2 Ld. Raym. at 953.
If then when a statute gives a right, the party shall have an action
for the infringement of it, is it not as forcible when a man has his
right by the common law? This right of voting is a right in the
plaintiff by the common law, and consequently he shall maintain
an action for the obstruction of it.
Id. at 136; 2 Ld. Raym. at 954.
Let us consider wherein the law consists, and we shall find it to be,
not in particular instances and precedents; but on the reason of the
law, and ubi eadem ratio, ubi idem jus. This privilege of voting
does not differ from any other franchise whatsoever.
204
205

Id. at 138; 2 Ld. Raym. at 957.
Herndon, 273 U.S. at 541.
Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73, 82 (1932).
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way determine who shall be qualified to vote or otherwise participate
in such political party . . . .”206 Pursuant to this new statute, the State
Executive Committee of the Democratic Party promptly adopted a
resolution limiting participation in primaries to “all white democrats . . . and none other . . . .”207
Writing for the Court in Nixon v. Condon, Justice Cardozo
observed that the clear intention of the new legislation was to separate
“state action” (restrained by the Fourteenth Amendment) from the
decision to exclude Blacks. “[P]rivate persons unconnected with [the
S]tate”—for example, the plenary membership of the Texas Democratic Party, assembled in convention—might have prescribed the
qualifications of its members.208
Instead, the statute lodged the power in a committee, which
excluded the petitioner and others of his race, not by virtue of any
authority delegated by the party, but by virtue of an authority
originating or supposed to originate in the mandate of the law.
. . . Power so intrenched is statutory, not inherent. If the [S]tate
had not conferred it, there would be hardly color of right to give a
basis for its exercise.209

Once again, “the great restraints of the Constitution set limits to” the
power of the State;210 and the right to vote had to be wrested forcibly
from the malign grip of Texas by a stubbornly persevering plaintiff,
wielding the Fourteenth Amendment as a powerful sword.
Today, the “American experiment” in enlightened self-governance
must be written off—for now at least—largely as a failure.211
206
207
208

209

210
211

See id.
See id.
Id. at 83. “[In State conventions] platforms of principles are announced and the
tests of party allegiance made known to the world. What is true in that regard of
parties generally is true more particularly in Texas, where the statute is explicit
in committing to the [S]tate convention the formulation of the party faith.” Id. at
85.
Id. at 84–85. The Court in Condon acknowledged that a recent state court
decision had found that the statute in question constituted an express “‘grant of
power’ to the State Executive Committee . . . to determine who shall participate
in [primary elections]” because “the Legislature grant[ed] th[is] power in
language too plain to admit of controversy . . . .” Id. at 87 n.1 (quoting Love v.
Buckner, 49 S.W.2d 425, 426 (Tex. 1932)).
Id. at 89.
See David Remnick, The Unwinding of Donald Trump, NEW YORKER (July 17,
2018),
https://www.newyorker.com/news/daily-comment/the-unwinding-ofdonald-trump [https://perma.cc/KFP6-DW7R]. Rather than enlightenment:
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Domestic ideologies of an unmistakably autocratic and authoritarian
tenor, imperialist nationalism as foreign “policy,”212 willful disregard
of scientific evidence, blinding ignorance enshrined in the administrative agencies, and routine lying on the part of the President213—
The vague sense of torpor and gloom that so many Americans have
shouldered these past two years derives precisely from the
[Presidency].
....
. . . [It has] raised dark suspicions and aroused the sickening
feeling that we are living in the pages of the most lurid espionage
novel ever written. Robert Mueller and his investigators may never
get to the end of the mysteries that they are exploring. They may
never get to the end of the myriad corruptions, furtive connections,
and double-dealings.
212

213

Id.
See, e.g., Thomas L. Friedman, Opinion, Trump is China’s Chump, N.Y. TIMES
(June 28, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/28/opinion/trump-chinaasia-pacific-trade-tpp.html [https://perma.cc/FAJ8-EV9Y].
David Leonhardt & Stuart A. Thompson, Opinion, President Trump’s Lies, N.Y.
TIMES,
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/06/23/opinion/trumpslies.html [https://perma.cc/7QQ7-2QM8]; Jack Shafer, Week 62: Trump’s
Losing a Tabloid War to His Own Lawyer, POLITICO (July 27, 2018),
https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2018/07/27/trump-lawyers-cohengiuliani-avenatti-davis-219075 [https://perma.cc/VU4Z-8ZTH].
Not since Donald Trump salted the New York tabloids in the
1980s and ‘90s with his signature formula of leaks, lies and lunacy
has our daily news diet tasted so vividly of scandal . . . . [Rudy]
Giuliani’s client [President Trump] is one of the best-documented
liars on the planet. Why should anybody believe anything a liar’s
lawyer says in his defense?
Id.
In his first year as President, Trump made 2,140 false claims,
according to the [Washington] Post. In just the last six months, he
has nearly doubled that total to 4,229. In June and July, he
averaged sixteen false claims a day.
....
. . . At this point, the falsehoods are as much a part of his
political identity as his floppy orange hair and the “Make America
Great Again” slogan. The untruths . . . are Trump’s political
“secret sauce.”
Susan B. Glasser, It’s True: Trump Is Lying More, and He’s Doing It on
Purpose, NEW YORKER (Aug. 3, 2018), https://www.newyorker.com/news/

264

UMass Law Review

v. 15 | 197

these are all now firmly ensconced at the highest levels of
government.214

letter-from-trumps-washington/trumps-escalating-war-on-the-truth-is-onpurpose [https://perma.cc/2WE5-AXGN].
[H]is favorite moniker by far is “Witch Hunt”—embellished, in
recent weeks, to “Rigged Witch Hunt”—which Trump has used a
whopping 84 times this year alone in reference to Mueller’s
investigation.
. . . Multiple studies have shown that when something is
repeated often enough, people start to think of it as true, whether it
actually is—a concept known as illusory truth. “When a statement
is repeated, it starts to feel more familiar,” said Keith Payne, a
psychology and neuroscience professor at the University of North
Carolina at Chapel Hill. “That feeling of familiarity is easily
interpreted as the feeling of truth.” Payne is the co-author of a
study that found that even when people know a claim is false, just
a few repetitions can make them more likely to think it’s true.

214

Olivia Paschal, Trump’s Tweets and the Creation of ‘Illusory Truth,’ ATLANTIC
(Aug. 3, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2018/08/howtrumps-witch-hunt-tweets-create-an-illusory-truth/566693/
[https://perma.cc/6MAP-JEZF].
Andrew G. McCabe, former Acting Director and Deputy Director of the FBI,
writes:
People do not appreciate how far we have fallen from normal
standards of presidential accountability. Today we have a president
who is willing not only to comment prejudicially on criminal
prosecutions but to comment on ones that potentially affect him.
He does both of these things almost daily. He is not just sounding a
dog whistle. He is lobbying for a result. The president has stepped
over bright ethical and moral lines wherever he has encountered
them. Every day brings a new low, with the president exposing
himself as a deliberate liar who will say whatever he pleases to get
whatever he wants.
Andrew G. McCabe, Every Day is a New Low in Trump’s White House,
ATLANTIC
(Feb.
14,
2019),
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/
archive/2019/02/andrew-mccabe-fbi-book-excerpt-the-threat/582748/
[https://perma.cc/Y4QR-A7WL]. See also Dwight Garner, In ‘The Threat,’
Andrew McCabe Issues the Latest Warning Call About Trump’s America, N.Y.
TIMES (Feb. 16, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/16/books/reviewthreat-fbi-trump-andrew-mccabe.html [https://perma.cc/65J2-PM7D] (book
review) (“What more could a person do to erode the credibility of the
presidency?” (quoting ANDREW G. MCCABE, THE THREAT: HOW THE FBI
PROTECTS AMERICA IN THE AGE OF TERROR AND TRUMP 217 (2019)).
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Despite all this, the right to vote continues to be described as a
cherished or “precious” right. If this were so, voting would be pursued
with all the excitement and vigor of finding diamonds strewn along the
streets or searching for solid gold Easter Eggs hidden in every
meadow. But it is not. Americans have “voted with their feet” (or,
rather, not), producing a pitiful turnout rate of 55.4% in the most
recent presidential election, based on voting-age population.215
The Census Bureau estimated that there were 245.5 million
Americans ages 18 and older in November 2016, about 157.6
million of whom reported being registered to vote. (While political
scientists typically define turnout as votes cast divided by the
number of eligible voters, in practice turnout calculations usually
are based on the estimated voting-age population, or VAP.)
. . . [I]n 2016 . . . the actual number of votes tallied [was] nearly
136.8 million.216

This sorry statistic should be kept firmly in mind in the context of any
proposal to restrict voting rights. Under our current system, the main
“restriction” is imposed by potential voters themselves.
Voting is not a precious right, but it could be. Restricting the
electorate on the basis of educational qualifications is a proposition
fraught with all the usual possibilities of unintended consequences. But
the consequences of inaction are evident for all to see. They amount,
as Roger Cohen suggests, to a “seeping, constant attempt—one sacred
value at a time—to disorient Americans to the point they accept the
unacceptable, cede to the grotesque, acquiesce to total arbitrariness as
a governing principle.”217
215

216

217

Dwight R. Lee, Voting with Ballots Versus Voting with Your Feet, LIBR. ECON.
& LIBERTY (Feb. 5, 2018), https://www.econlib.org/library/Columns/y2018/
Leevoting.html [https://perma.cc/Z9NR-7R4H]; see also Gregory Wallace,
Voter Turnout at 20-Year Low in 2016, CNN (Nov. 30, 2016, 10:48 AM)
https://www.cnn.com/2016/11/11/politics/popular-vote-turnout-2016/index.html
[https://perma.cc/95L5-7ZGN].
Drew DeSilver, U.S. Trails Most Developed Countries in Voter Turnout, PEW
RES. CTR. (May 21, 2018), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/05/
21/u-s-voter-turnout-trails-most-developed-countries/ [https://perma.cc/5JXLY4D5].
Roger Cohen, Trump 2020 Is No Joke. Nor Are the Head-Spinning Distractions,
N.Y. TIMES, June 24, 2017, at A18; cf. George Packer, Get Out and Vote, NEW
YORKER, Aug. 6 & 13, 2018, at 13:
The midterm elections in November are the last remaining obstacle
to President Trump’s consolidation of power. None of the other
forces that might have checked the rise of a corrupt homegrown
oligarchy can stop or even slow it. The institutional clout that
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The Supreme Court does not dispute that “education . . . bears a
peculiarly close relationship to other rights and liberties accorded
protection under the Constitution.”218 Thus, a constitutional amendment imposing an educational requirement for voting does not simply
stand in opposition to voting rights—as an irrelevant obstacle—the
way a poll tax219 or a property requirement220 would. Arguably,
education enhances the right to vote. Voting may be enhanced
indirectly by education through greater and more insightful
participation in freedom of speech (especially in the political
“marketplace of ideas”); and directly, by counteracting modern
society’s “characteristic lack of discerning judgment,” of which
Hannah Arendt wrote.221 As the Supreme Court stated in San Antonio
Independent School District v. Rodriguez:
[Appellees contend] that education . . . is essential to the effective
exercise of First Amendment freedoms and to intelligent utilization
of the right to vote. In asserting a nexus between speech and
education, appellees urge that the right to speak is meaningless
unless the speaker is capable of articulating his thoughts
intelligently and persuasively. The ‘marketplace of ideas’ is an
empty forum for those lacking basic communicative tools.
Likewise, they argue that the corollary right to receive information
becomes little more than a hollow privilege when the recipient has

ended the Presidency of Richard Nixon no longer exists. The
honest press, for all its success in exposing daily scandals, won’t
persuade the unpersuadable or shame the shameless, while the
dishonest press is Trump’s personal amplifier. The federal courts,
including the Supreme Court, are rapidly becoming instruments of
partisan advocacy, as reliably conservative as elected legislatures.
It’s impossible to imagine the Roberts Court voting unanimously
against the President, as the Burger Court, including five
Republican appointees, did in forcing Nixon to turn over his tapes.
(Brett Kavanaugh, Trump’s nominee to succeed Anthony
Kennedy, has even suggested that the decision was wrong.)
Congress has readily submitted to the President’s will, as if
legislation and oversight were burdens to be relinquished. And,
when the independent counsel finally releases his report, it will
have only the potency that the guardians of the law and the
Constitution give it.
218

219
220
221

Summarizing arguments, see supra Part III.C, that the Court does “not dispute.”
San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 35 (1973).
Harper v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966).
See Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621, 631–32 (1969).
ARENDT, supra note 168, at 305 n.1.
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not been taught to read, assimilate, and utilize available
knowledge.
A similar line of reasoning is pursued with respect to the right
to vote. Exercise of the franchise, it is contended, cannot be
divorced from the educational foundation of the voter. The
electoral process, if reality is to conform to the democratic ideal,
depends on an informed electorate: a voter cannot cast his ballot
intelligently unless his reading skills and thought processes have
been adequately developed.
We need not dispute any of these propositions. The Court has
long afforded zealous protection against unjustifiable governmental interference with the individual’s rights to speak and to
vote.222

Here the High Court pauses. “Yet,” observes Justice Powell,
writing for the Court, “we have never presumed to possess either the
ability or the authority to guarantee to the citizenry the most effective
speech or the most informed electoral choice.”223 That those are
“desirable goals . . . is not to be doubted”—but pursuing them would
implicate public policy concerns foreign to the Court’s strictly judicial
mandate.224 “[T]hey are not values to be implemented by judicial
intrusion into otherwise legitimate state activities”—hence the need for
constitutional amendment.225
The right to vote, and voting itself, are still ultimately something of
a puzzle. Inside the voting booth—faced with an imponderable array
of candidates for, say, Commissioner of Agriculture—the system
seems primitive indeed. It is hard to see this as a rational way of
imparting information. It is hard to see this banal, bureaucratic setting
as the “primal scene” of democracy. On a strict cost-benefit analysis,
voting in a national election (even in our convoluted Electoral College
system) could be viewed as irrational.226 No national election in the
United States has ever been decided by a single vote, nor would one
ever be. Instead, one must look beyond such considerations for a
voting “rationale.”
Perhaps the best analogy is to consider voting “symbolic”—not
unlike school spirit, esprit de corps, and patriotism itself. In other
222
223
224
225
226

Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 35–36 (emphasis added).
Id. at 36 (emphasis added).
Id.
Id.
See, e.g., Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of Political Action in a
Democracy, 65 J. POL. ECON. 135, 145–146, 149 (1957).
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words, the purpose of voting is to encourage others to vote. It is an act
of “symbolic solidarity.” “Individually”—the thinking goes—“we do
not matter; our vote does not matter. But together we can make a
difference.” The strongest and most informative routes to this outlook
and its associated insights run directly through the educational system.
Thus, the proposed article of amendment, while formally introducing
more restrictive voter qualifications, may actually lead to greater
participation in voting by a more thoughtful, informed, judicious, and
politically educated electorate.
At some point, the fears of young people will overwhelm the fears
of the old. Some time after that, the young will amass enough
power to act. It will be too late to avoid some catastrophes, but
perhaps not others. Humankind is nothing if not optimistic . . . .227

227

Nathaniel Rich, Losing Earth: The Decade We Almost Stopped Climate Change.
A Tragedy in Two Acts, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Aug. 5, 2018, at 66.

